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Eﬃciency wage theory has been used to provide an explanation of in-
voluntary unemployment and other phenomena as dual labour mar-
kets, that are at odds with the competitive model of the labour
market (Katz 1985, Rebitzer 1989).
T h ee s s e n c eo fe ﬃciency wages is that they are more likely to
arise in situations, where there are restrictions in the implementation
of eﬃcient contracts, as bonding and several theoretical arguments
have been oﬀered to support or dismiss the validity of restrictions
that open the door to eﬃciency wages (Manning 2003).
Moreover, several theoretical arguments can be provided to sup-
port the view that there are valid eﬃciency wages considerations in
low-wage labour markets. For example, one can argue that a bind-
ing minimum wage, will prevent employers to tilt the wage-tenure
proﬁle in order to solve agency problems in low-wage labour markets
(Krueger 1991), and also that low-wage workers are more likely to
face ﬁnancial constraints that prevent them from posting a bond,
compared to better-paid workers (Weiss 1991).
However, eﬃciency wages in low-wage labour markets cannot be
supported or dismissed on a priory theoretical grounds and evidence
is needed (Dickens, Katz and Lang 1985).
Although, the relevance of eﬃciency wages in general is mainly
an empirical question, there is a lack of credible empirical evidence
on eﬃciency wages, as most empirical studies in the topic are un-
persuasive and inconclusive (Autor 2003).
This lack of strong evidence on eﬃciency wages is mainly ex-
plained by problems that make the empirical testing of eﬃciency
wages particularly vexing (Rebitzer 1995, Manning and Thomas
1997).
In particular, an overview of the empirical literature of stud-
i e st h a tt e s te ﬃciency wages by testing the hypothesis of a wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ suggests that it is quite diﬃcult to overcome
the endogeneity problem successfully and that is why there have
been very few studies that manage to address the problem (Groshen
and Krueger 1990, Krueger 1991, Rebitzer 1995) by using a valid in-
strument for the causing variable of interest (in this case supervision
intensity).
In this paper we exploit the ideal research design provided by
the 1999 introduction and 2001 increase of the UK National Mini-
mum Wage (NMW henceforth) in order to identify the relationship
between wages and supervision and to test the validity of eﬃciency
wage theory in a low wage labour market. We also oﬀer evidence
of the eﬀects of the UK National Minimum wage on other labour
market as wages, employment, prices, proﬁts and output as well as
on other eﬃciency wages related outcomes as staﬀ recruitment and
2quits.
The data used were drawn from two before and after surveys
conducted in the UK residential care homes industry, one of the
sectors with the lowest pay in the UK economy, where one expects
that the minimum wage is binding.
The identiﬁcation strategy used, under this research design, is
based on the implementation of the diﬀerence in diﬀerences method-
ology (Meyer 1995, Angrist and Krueger 1999).
In general, the introduction or increase of a minimum wage pro-
vides an ideal setting for testing eﬃciency wages, as the essence of
eﬃciency wages is that above market clearing wages generate gains
in terms of employees’ productivity.
In summary our ﬁndings have as follows: we ﬁnd a sizeable eﬀect
of the 1999 NMW introduction and 2001 increase on wages of care
homes from the south coast of England but we ﬁnd some moderate
negative eﬀects on employment for the 1999 introduction and no
employment eﬀects for the 2001 increase. Our empirical analysis
further suggests that the minimum wage hasn’t aﬀected prices in
1999 but increased the price of care homes services in 2001 and in
general caused no eﬀect on proﬁts in either 1999 and 2001.
Furthermore, as far as any longer run eﬀects of the minimum wage
is concerned, we ﬁnd no eﬀects of the minimum wage introduction
and subsequent increases up to 2001 on home closures and no eﬀect
on the skill composition of workforce and on capital/labour ratio.
We also ﬁnd some evidence of output reduction to be the case after
the 1999 NMW introduction and eﬀort increases for the 2001 NMW
increase.
Moreover, although we ﬁnd some evidence of moderate output
reductions in 1999 we fail to ﬁnd any evidence of signiﬁcant changes
in productivity and subjective eﬀort across care homes in both the
98/99 and 01/02 samples.
Finally and most importantly, after addressing the main empir-
ical problems that hinder the estimation of the wage-supervision
relationship, we ﬁnd that the 1999 increase in the minimum wage
followed by decreases in home’s intensity of supervision a ﬁnding
which provides support to the eﬃciency wages predictions of the
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ.
Moreover, after testing whether higher wages paid for themselves,
we ﬁnd some evidence that the wage increases resulted by the 1999
NMW introduction, were more or less exactly oﬀset by the fall in
supervision costs, a ﬁnding which if combined with the evidence of
the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, seems to support that the minimum
wage may have operated as an eﬃciency wage in the care homes
industry.
Although, the above ﬁndings provide some support to the ‘shirk-
ing’ eﬃciency wages model we do not ﬁnd any evidence that supports
3the ‘turnover’ or ‘adverse selection’ models of eﬃciency wages as we
fail to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the impact of the 1999 NMW intro-
duction and 2001 increase on the average job experience of workforce
and on average tenure as well as the quit and recruitment rates.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sum-
marizes the main recent studies in the topic of minimum wages in
general and in the UK in particular and highlights the most impor-
tant gaps in the minimum wage literature.
Section 3 and 4 present a discussion of the data and some descrip-
tive statistics of the care homes samples before and after the 1999
NMW introduction and 2001 increase respectively and our analysis
on the eﬀects of the NMW introduction and increase on wages and
employment respectively.
Section 5 presents our ﬁndings on the NMW eﬀects on prices,
proﬁts and any long run outcomes (closures, substitution of capital
and higher skilled labour for low skilled labour). Finally, section 6
investigates the eﬀects of the NMW introduction and increase on
labour productivity, eﬀort, supervision intensity and other poten-
tial gains of higher wages in terms of changes in the average age-
experience of the workforce, and changes in the average tenure as
well as the quit and recruitment rates. Section 9 then concludes.
2 A Brief Review of the Minimum Wage Liter-
ature
The economic eﬀects of minimum wages is a heavily researched
issue that generates much controversy, especially after the striking
ﬁndings of Card and Krueger (1995) that cast doubt on the orthodox
view of the eﬀects of the policy on employment. Although, the
debate on the issue remains, one of the points of agreement among
economists in the topic of minimum wages is that more evidence is
needed to inform the debate and improve insight (Card and Krueger
1995, Dolado et al 1996, Dolado et. al 2000).
It is true that the vast majority of empirical evidence on the
economic eﬀects of minimum wages is from the US labour market
and little is known about the eﬀects of the minimum wage policy
in other labour markets (Dolado et al 1996, Dickens Machin and
Manning 1999, Lemos 2002).
There are many economists among those who believe that more
international empirical work could cast much light in many ﬁelds of
labour economics and in particular in the topic of minimum wages
(Hamermesh 2002).
As far as the UK is concerned, Machin and Manning (1994) and
Dickens, Machin and Manning (1999) investigated the economic ef-
4fects of Wages Councils and their 1993 abolition on economic out-
comes. Since the abolition of Wages Councils in 1993 there was no
minimum wage in the UK (except of the agricultural sector), but
the labour party which was reelected in the government in 1997
committed to introduce a minimum wage. A UK wide (national)
minimum wage was legislated with eﬀect from April 1999, fact which
provided a unique setting for the investigation of the economic ef-
fects of the minimum wage introduction in a previously unregulated
labour market.
Machin, Manning and Rahman (2002, 2003) exploited this unique
setting and conducted two surveys in order to collect primary data
before and after the introduction of the UK National Minimum
Wage from ﬁrms in the residential care homes industry, one of the
sectors with the lowest wages in the UK. The data collection en-
abled Machin et al. to implement what is now considered a stan-
dard technique in the empirical literature of minimum wages (Card
and Krueger 1995). Their main conclusions were that the minimum
wage introduction caused a substantial increase in wages and signif-
icantly compressed the wage distribution in the care homes sector
but had only moderate employment eﬀects.
Moreover, Machin and Wilson (2004) used additional data (col-
lected by the Centre for Economic Performance) to that of the
Machin et al (2003) study from residential care homes from the
south coast of England, to investigate the eﬀects of the 2001 UK
NMW increase, the largest increase in minimum wage rates since
the introduction of the policy. In particular, Machin and Wilson
used the data from the before and after 1999 NMW introduction on
care homes throughout the UK (us e di nt h eM a c h i n ,M a n n i n ga n d
Rahman study) and the additional data from the before and after
2001 NMW increase on care homes from the south coast of England
to implement the standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences technique and
investigate the eﬀects of the 1999 introduction and 2001 increase in
UK NMW on wages and employment.
Additionally, Machin and Wilson (2004) also address the eﬀects
of minimum wages on closures of south coast care homes between the
period before the 1999 introduction and before the 2001 increase.
The results produced by Machin and Wilson (2004) study show
sizeable wage eﬀects and some evidence of employment reductions
but their analysis suggests that the 1999 introduction of the NMW
had no eﬀect on home closures.
The main objective of this paper is to exploit the unique research
design provided by the UK NMW 1999 introduction and 2001 in-
crease by using the south coast care homes data (which were kindly
provided by Steve Machin and Joanne Wilson) to identify the rela-
tionship between wages and supervision and to test the validity of
eﬃciency wages theory.
5Another objective of this paper is to use the care homes data in
order to reproduce the Machin and Wilson work but also to extend
it in order to investigate the eﬀects of the NMW introduction and
increase on other outcomes such as prices, proﬁts, eﬀort and pro-
ductivity, as well as looking for other longer run adjustments such
as closures and factors substitution.1 This is because another gap
than the lack of non-US evidence in the minimum wage literature
is the lack of suﬃcient evidence of the eﬀects of minimum wages
on other outcomes than employment and the wage distribution and
particularly on the eﬀects of minimum wages in the long-run (Brown
1999).
The investigation of any minimum wage eﬀects on prices, prof-
its, and long-run outcomes as the exit and entry of aﬀected ﬁrms
could provide a more complete picture of how low-wage labour mar-
kets operate and especially on the eﬀects of the policy on employers
as most of the existing research has focused on minimum wage ef-
fects on aﬀected workers (Card and Krueger 1995). Moreover, as
suggested by the review of the theory of the minimum wage of the
previous section, theory generates both short run and long run pre-
dictions and thus it is important for empirical studies to distinguish
between the two.
In particular, Brown (1999) indicates that the long-run eﬀects
of minimum wages consist the larger and most important gap in
the minimum wage literature. This is the case for many reasons
as for example there is a stunning lack of credible studies or even
attempts on the eﬀects of minimum wages in the long run (Brown
1999). However, the main reason why this remains an important
gap is that it may provide a potential explanation of the puzzle
that recent estimates of minimum wage employment elasticities are
small. As suggested by theory the demand for labour is more elastic
in the long run, where ﬁrms may downsize or exit and potential
entrants may be deterred. Moreover, most of the empirical studies
that investigate the employment eﬀe c t so fm i n i m u mw a g e sf o c u so n
sample of ﬁrms that continue operation and do not look for any exit
that may have taken place as a result of the policy (Rebitzer and
Taylor 1995).
In general exit or entry eﬀects cause discontinuous changes in
employment and thus should be seriously considered (Hamermesh
1Machin, Manning and Rahmans paper was ﬁrstly published in 1999 as a CEP discussion
paper but revised drafts have been produced until 2002. The discussion paper included also
investigation of minimum wage eﬀects on prices, closures and openings and worker’s produc-
tivity, but the closures-openings analysis wasn’t included in their published paper (Machin,
Manning and Rahman 2003), probably because the authors didn’t ﬁnd any signiﬁcant min-
imum wage eﬀects on closure and opening probabilities and on county closure and opening
rate, but also because the timing of the post-introduction survey is such that any long-run
adjustments cannot be identiﬁed as it is unlikely that long-run adjustments as exit and entry
took place in such a short-time after the NMW introduction.
61992). This is another reason why it is important to look for evi-
dence on other longer run outcomes.
We do not know many studies that look also on other possible ad-
justments to the policy other than employment (Card and Krueger
1995). Card and Krueger (1995) and Brown (1999) devote some of
their analysis in investigating or reviewing the minimum wage ef-
fects on prices, proﬁts, fringe beneﬁts and stock value of employers of
low-wage workers among other outcomes but their main conclusion
is that more evidence is needed to provide a more clear picture.
Although some evidence has been produced on any other short
run adjustments the main lack of evidence as suggested above has
been on the eﬀects of the policy on exit and entry of ﬁrms in the
long run. Indeed we know very few studies that address these issues
and their characteristic is that all studies devote only a minor part
of the analysis on these hypotheses.
Zavodny (1996) addresses this particular question using data on
drinking and eating places, retail trade and clothing stores the two
largest employers of minimum wage workers in the US and thus
the most heavily aﬀected sectors. The main ﬁndings of the study
suggest that the minimum wage had a positive eﬀect on the number
of ﬁrms in the aﬀected sectors.
On the other hand Waltman, Mcbride and Camhout (1998, 1999)
examine the same hypothesis using data on the aggregate rate of
business failures. This study ﬁnds no eﬀect of the minimum wage
on business failures, but suﬀers from many econometric problems as
suggested by Taylor and Arnold (1999). Moreover, Alpert (1986)
also examines this issue together with other issues using US quar-
terly data on restaurant failures. Alpert ﬁnds no evidence that
restaurant failures have been adversely aﬀected by the minimum
wage
Card and Krueger (1995), also investigate a similar hypothesis
by considering the eﬀects of minimum wages on Mcdonald’s fast-
food restaurants openings during the years 1986 and 1991 and in
contrast to conventional wisdom they ﬁnd positive but not statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀects of minimum wages in restaurant openings,
suggesting that the minimum wage does not seem to have a strong
(negative or positive) eﬀect on openings in the fast-food industry.
All, the above evidence reviewed are from the US and indeed we
know only two recent studies or empirical attempt to identify exit
or entry eﬀects of the minimum wage policy in Europe.
This evidence is provided by Machin, Manning and Rahman
(2003) (MMR henceforth) and Machi na n dW i l s o n( M Wh e n c e f o r t h )
who both exploit the fact that a nation wide minimum wage has
been introduced in April 19992 and has been increased several times
2The UK National Minimum Wage has been set at $3.6 for those aged 22 and over (the
7since then with the bigger increase being the one that took place in
October 2001.3
MMR (1999) used the data collected from a sample of residen-
tial care homes throughout the UK in order to investigate also the
impact of the minimum wage on the probability of closure across
homes as well as in the closure and opening rate across counties, be-
tween July 1998 and May 1999, but they fail to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
eﬀects. However, they suggest that the timing of the post NMW
introduction survey may not allow for the identiﬁcation of long run
adjustments to the minimum wage as that of exit and entry.
MW (2004) oﬀer a more credible attempt to investigate the re-
lationship between the impact of the minimum wage and home clo-
sures using a sample of care homes from 8 south coast UK counties
between the July 1998 and just before October 2001 NMW increase,
a period that possibly allows for the identiﬁcation of any minimum
wage eﬀects on exit. The main ﬁnding of MW, as also discussed
above, is that they fail to ﬁnd any systematic relationship between
home closures and the NMW introduction.
3 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Survey Design
O u ra n a l y s i si sb a s e do ni n f o r m a t i o no na l lw o r k e r si ne a c hh o m e
and on home characteristics from a sample of care homes in the
South Coast of England, collected by two surveys, the one conducted
before and after the 1999 NMW introduction and the other before
and after the 2001 NMW increase.
The data were collected through the Centre for Economic Per-
formance (CEP) in LSE, by mailing a survey questionnaire to the
manager of each care home. Both surveys were implemented using
lists of homes from the Yellow Pages Business Database, but the
adult rate) and at $3.00 for those between 18 and 21 years old inclusive (the development
rate). Those below 18 were not covered.
3The development rate has been increased to $ 3.20 in June 2000, whereas the adult rate
increased again to $ 3.70 in October 2000. Since then, both rates have been increased every
October with the biggest increase to date the one that took place in October 2001 where the
adult rate increased from $3.70 to $4.10 and the development rate from $3.20 to $3.50, a
10.8 % and 9.3% increase respectively (Metcalf 2004) (The increase in the development rate
in October 2004 from $3.80 to $4.10 per hour is the same as that in 2001 in absolute ﬁgures
but proportionately lower). The most recent increase in the NMW has been in October 2004
where the adult and development rates have been increased from $4.5 to $4.85 and from $3.80
to $4.10 respectively and a NMW introduced for those aged 16 and 17 (above compulsory
school leaving age) at $3.00 per hour. Moreover, the Low Pay Commission recommended
an increase in the adult rate from $4.85 to $5.05 and to the development rate from $4.10 to
$4.25 eﬀective from October 2005. For an overview of the history and a review of the evidence
produced up to now on the eﬀects of the UK NMW see Metcalf (2004). MMR provide also a
good background of the NMW policy (2003).
8before and after 1999 NMW introduction focused on the whole UK
population of residential care homes in July 1998 and in May 1999,4
whereas the before and after the 2001 NMW increase survey focused
on the population of homes from the South Coast UK counties in
August 2001 and February 2002.5
The questionnaire included questions about manager’s informa-
tion and attitude towards the NMW,6 as well as questions about
the home ownership type (private, local authority, etc.), whether
the home is part of larger organisation, the number of registered
beds, the number of residents, etc. Managers were also asked to
provide data on job title, sex, age, length of service, possession of a
nursing qualiﬁcation, weekly hours and hourly wages for all workers
in the home.
All (three) surveys achieved a reasonable response rate for a
mail survey (around 20%).7 Note that as in MMR (2004) in the
cases where there was missing information on hourly wages and
4However, as also mentioned above, our analysis on the eﬀects of the 1999 NMW intro-
duction is based on a subset of this data set including only homes from the South Coast of
England, see MW (2004) for a detailed discussion.
5The former population was around 11, 000 and the latter around 2,500 care homes. In
fact there was another survey implemented in the population of South Coast care homes
around the window of the 1992 elections, since the Labour Party had committed to introduce
a minimum wage if they were elected. The fact that they were not elected meant that data
could not be used for the purpose of evaluating minimum wage eﬀects. However, the after
1992 elections survey implemented anyway, as the data considered useful for the study of the
wage structure of the Care homes sector (Machin and Manning, 2002), and in order to look at
wage and employment changes during a period when the minimum wage was not introduced
(MMR 2003). See also MMR (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the 1999 survey design
and data collection and MW (2004) for a further discussion of all three surveys.
6These kind of questions diﬀered between the before and after the NMW introduction and
increase for apparent reasons.
7The care homes samples of the before and after 1999 surveys included 1866 and 2142
homes respectively, whereas the 2001 before and after survey samples included 411 and 333
homes respectively. MMR apply their analysis also in two subsets of the whole 1999 care homes
sample: the balanced panel of homes which includes 641 homes that were surveyed both before
and after the 1999 NMW introduction and a subset of the balanced sample which excludes
homes with lots of missing information, i.e. homes in which more than half of information on
hourly wages and weekly hours is missing, and includes in total 615 homes. The South Coast
subset of homes in the MMR sample, on which our analysis focuses includes 548 homes prior
to the NMW introduction and 579 after the introduction, and the balanced sample includes
195 homes but no other subset of the balanced sample is produced, as there are no South
Coast homes with more than half workers information missing. Note that there is a diﬀerence
in the size of the 1999 balanced sample of South Coast carehomes included in our analysis
and that of MW, who report that their wage and employment change regressions were based
on a sample 181 homes, where no controls were included. This is why we also try to check the
matching of homes included in the before 2001 NMW increase sample with homes included
in the after 2001 sample. We ﬁnd that the balanced sample of homes seems to be consisted
of 152 homes in contrast to MW who report 173 homes in their wage change regressions and
193 homes in their employment change regressions when no controls were included. Finally,
as the 2001 balanced sample included also 22 homes with more than half workers information
missing we also present survey statistics for a subset of 130 homes from balanced sample which
excludes homes with lots of missing information on workers’ hourly wages and weekly hours.
9weekly hours we impute them using the home average, but both
statistics with imputed and non-imputed are reported. MMR and
MW provide evidence and discussions that seems to support the
fact that all (three) samples of care homes were representative of
the corresponding population in terms of workers’ wage, age, hours
and tenure8 (see Woodland, 1993, MMR 2003 and MW 2004 for a
detailed discussion).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The two survey statistics that are presented in table 1 and table 2
(see tables section at the end) summarise the main features of the
w h o l es a m p l eo fc a r eh o m e sb e f o r ea n da f t e rt h e1 9 9 9N M Wi n t r o -
duction and the 2001 NMW increase, as well as the main character-
istics of the balanced sample of homes, which includes only homes
that were surveyed both before and after the Minimum wage intro-
duction/increase. The vast majority of care homes in all samples is
consisted of private and independent establishments with very few
homes being voluntary or owned by local authority and a part of a
large organisation.9 As presented in table 1 and 2, the main sam-
ple statistics are fairly similar between the whole sample and the
balanced samples of homes in both the 1999 and 2001 before-after
surveys, suggesting that the balanced sample is representative of the
whole sample and the population of care homes as a whole.
The two tables clearly reveal some of the main characteristics of
the care homes sector. Firstly, the average hourly wage is quite low
and in particular slightly above the adult rate both in the period
before the NMW 1999 introduction and 2001 increase,10 af a c tw h i c h
suggests that the sector is expected to be heavily aﬀected by the
minimum wage introduction and increase.
The fact that the vast majority of employees at home are female,
that the average number of hours is below thirty and that care
8The same holds for the 1999 South Coast care homes sample used in our analysis, which
is a subset of the whole 1999 care homes sample used in MMR’s analysis, as sample statistics
of wages, hours, age and tenure between the two samples are very similar.
9In particular 481 out of 548 homes in the before 1999 NMW introduction sample are
private and only 65 are part of a large organisation. Moreover, 489 out of 579 homes in the
after 1999 NMW are single independent establishments and 499 are privately owned. The 1999
balanced sample includes only 25 homes that are not privately owned and 19 that are part of
large organisation, out of 195 care homes included in total. Similarly, 368 out of 411 homes in
the before 2001 sample are privately owned and only 60 are part of a large organisation. The
after 2001 NMW increase sample includes 45 non-privately owned homes and 281 independent
establishments out of 333 care homes in total. Finally, the 2001 balanced sample includes only
14 non-private homes and only 18 homes that are part of a larger organisation, out of 152
observations in total.
10The average hourly wage is around $4 before the 1999 NMW introduction with the in-
troductory level of the adult national minimum rate being $3.6, whereas the same statistic is
around $4.7 before the 2001 increase with the 2001 adult rate being $4.1.
10assistants is the principal occupation, as well as the fact that a very
small fraction of employees has a nursing qualiﬁcation11 seems to
provide further support to the argument that minimum wage eﬀects
on care homes outcomes are expected to be substantial. This is
actually the case because low-skilled, female and part-time workers
form the majority of low-wage workers in the economy as a whole
(Low Pay Commission 1998, Metcalf 1999). Moreover, as it is also
suggested by the New Earnings Survey (MMR 2002) the occupation
of care assistants is probably the lowest paid occupation in the UK
(MMR 2003).
Other dominant characteristics of the 1999 and 2001 care homes
samples is that the representative home is small in size both in terms
of the number of employees and the number of residents (the number
of employees ranges between 14 to 16 on average per home in both
surveys), the majority of workers are older on average (the average
age at home is around 40 years old in both surveys) and that a signif-
icant proportion of residents have their fees paid by local authorities
(between 45% and 50% in both surveys), with the latter observation
suggesting that it is even more likely to ﬁnd minimum wage eﬀects
in the industry as the price of services for those residents are capped
by local authorities and thus the ability of home owners/managers
to pass some of the NMW costs on prices is expected to be quite
limited (MMR 2003).12
In their earlier paper MMR (2003) suggested that the fact that
the average home is small in size not only makes feasible the collec-
tion of good data on all employees but also implies that monitoring
problems are not expected to be severe. This may further suggest
that any eﬃciency wages considerations arising from imperfect mon-
itoring are unlikely to be valid in the sector.
Although home size may be an indicator of monitoring problems,
it is a good proxy for monitoring intensity only if there is only one
employee (probably the home owner) engaged in monitoring activi-
ties, which is unlikely to be the case, as the nature of the business is
such that home operates twenty four hours a day and seven days per
week which makes it impossible for a single owner to be physically
present and monitor employees all the time. Therefore, a better
measure of monitoring intensity (or observability of workers’ eﬀort),
11Nursing qualiﬁcation is the only relevant qualiﬁcation in the care homes sector. Note that
the proportion of workers at home with a nursing qualiﬁcation is the only statistic that diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between the 1999 and 2001 surveys.
12MMR (2002, 2003) and MW (2004) provide information that the level of the local au-
thorities security funding was not increased to meet the National Minimum Wage increase in
1999 which further implies that home owners-managers couldn’t pass on the costs to residents
(at least those that have their fees paid by local authorities) by setting higher prices. This
conjecture is further supported by a comparison of the average weekly price of bed in the
before and after 1999 NMW introduction in the whole and balanced samples which indicates
no signiﬁcant change in care homes prices.
11than the inverse of employment at home, could be the number of
managerial workers per non-managerial employee, the most popular
proxy of monitoring intensity in the literature (Odiorne 1963, Gor-
don 1990, 1994). The fact that supervision intensity may be better
approximated by the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employ-
ees than the inverse of employment is also supported by the scatter
plots of the number of non-managerial and managerial employees
of the whole care homes samples before the 1999 NMW introduc-
tion and before the 2001 NMW increase presented in ﬁgure 1 and 2
respectively. As indicated in the ﬁgures, although there are homes
with no or one manager only, in a signiﬁcant share of the sample
there are more than only 1 manager at home.13
Moreover, as presented in tables 2 and 3, there is approximately
one supervisor14 for every nine employees in the 1999 sample of
homes on average and around 1 managerial employee for every eleven
non-managerial employees on average in homes in the 2001 sample.
These averages, combined also with the “twenty four-seven” na-
ture of the business as well as the fact that the quality and not only
the quantity of monitoring is important in order to tackle agency
problems (Kruse 1992, Brunello 1995) may suggest that imperfect
monitoring considerations may still be valid, despite the small size
of the average home. Other considerations for the relevance of ef-
ﬁciency wages in care homes could be suggested by the quite high
turnover rate.15
Furthermore, diﬀerences in average hourly and weekly wages be-
tween before and after the NMW introduction and increase seem
to further indicate that indeed as expected homes in the sample
have experienced signiﬁcant increases in wage costs.16 In particu-
lar information from the balanced sample of homes suggests that
hourly wage was increased on average by 12 and 15 pence after the
1999 NMW introduction and the 2001 increase respectively (with or
without imputed information).17
13This holds more strongly for the 2001 than the 1999 sample of care homes.
14As managerial employees are classiﬁed employees with job titles: manager, home owner,
matron, deputy matron, assistant matron, deputy manager and assistant manager.
15Sample averages of the quit and recruitment rate for both the before the 1999 and before
2001 surveys, on average 13% of staﬀ has left and the same proportion was recruited the last
three months from the time of each survey. These turnover ﬁgures may be considered as quite
signiﬁcant considering the short period for which the relevant information is reported.
16This issue is analysed further in the next section where more measures of the ‘bite’ of the
minimum wage introduction and increase on the distribution of wages are presented.
17This means a 2.8% and a 3.4% increase in average hourly wages for the 1999 introduction
and the 2001 increase respectively. Note that our ﬁgures for the 1999 introduction diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those presented in MMR (2003), where the authors report an increase in
hourly wages of 24 pence or 6% for the sample of care homes throughout the UK. Another
interesting observation is that the absolute or proportionate change in the average hourly
wage is not found to be higher for the period of the introduction compared to that of the
NMW increase, as it would be expected.
12Moreover, as presented in table 2 the survey statistics (for the
balanced panel) do not seem to diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the pre
and post 1999 introduction period, except of hourly and weekly
wage (with or without imputed information), and of the ratio of
managerial to non-managerial employees at home. The noticeable
increase in supervision intensity in the after 1999 NMW introduction
(in the balanced sample)18 can be better explained by looking at the
changes in the cross section distribution of the number of managerial
and non-managerial staﬀ between the before and after the NMW
introduction. Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the distribution of the
number managerial staﬀ across homes remained fairly the same after
the NMW introduction, whereas in ﬁgures 5 and 6 we observe that
the distribution of the number of non-managerial staﬀ becomes more
skewed to the right after the introduction of the NMW.
Comparisons of pre and post survey statistics for the 2001 NMW
increase (from the balanced panel of care homes) suggest that again
the most heavily aﬀected outcomes in the sector are again hourly
and weekly wages as well as the proportion of care assistants, average
weekly price of bed19 as well as the proportion of residents whose
fees are paid by local authorities and the ratio of managerial to
non-managerial employees.20 In contrast to the 1999 introduction,
supervision intensity in this case decreases after the NMW increase,
a result which can be explained by the fact that the distribution of
the number of non-managerial staﬀ seems less compressed after the
increase compared to before the increase, whereas the distribution
of the number of managers becomes more skewed to the right and
more compressed after the 2001 NMW increase (see ﬁgure 7, 8, 9,
and 10).
The increase in hourly wages combined with the fall in the num-
ber of managerial relative to non-managerial employees and the
proportion of care assistants at home (who are low-skilled, non-
managerial employees) and may further reconcile with the predic-
tion of the shirking models of eﬃciency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984, Georgiadis 2001) that wage increases lead to relaxation in
monitoring intensity.21
In general indications of signiﬁcant wage eﬀects of the minimum
wage is a necessary condition, as also suggested by MMR (2003) in
18For the whole sample also the number of beds and number of residents seem to diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between the pre and post NMW introduction.
19As discussed in one of the following sections although prices remained capped by local
authorities in the period before and after 1999, they were not capped for the period around
the 2001 NMW increase.
20T h es a m es e e m st ob et h ec a s ef o rt h ew h o l es a m p l eo fc a r eh o m e s ,e x c e p to ft h ef a c t
that the supervisor/supervisee ratio remains unchanged, whereas the number of beds diﬀers
noticably between the pre and post increase survey.
21However this prediction is generated for given everything else, which is not the case for
the descriptive analysis.
13order to proceed and investigate the eﬀects of the policy on other
outcomes. Descriptive statistics from both surveys provide this kind
of indication but we need to address this issue properly by especially
looking whether wage eﬀects of the minimum wage were higher in
homes that seemed to be aﬀected the most by the policy.
4 The Eﬀects of the UK National Minimum Wage on
Wages and Employment
4.1 Wage Eﬀects
In the previous sections as well as in Machin, Manning and Rah-
man (2003 ) it is suggested that the wage eﬀects of the introduction
and increase in the NMW should be looked ﬁrst of all, as a signif-
icant NMW eﬀect on wages is a prerequisite in order to look for
further eﬀects on employment and other outcomes.
In tables 4 and 5 are presented measures of the ‘bite’ of the
minimum wage 1999 introduction and 2001 increase respectively.
Both tables indicate that a large proportion of workers were aﬀected
by both the introduction and the increase in the minimum wage and
also that these minimum wage changes generated a sizeable increase
in the wage bill, as suggested by the wage gap variable.
Additionally, both tables indicate that the adult rate is binding
for most care homes in 1999 and 2001, as around 30% of all workers
in the full and balanced sample of homes are paid below the adult
rate before the 1999 NMW introduction, whereas around 30% and
26% of all workers in the full and balanced sample respectively are
paid below the adult rate before the 2001 NMW increase. Moreover,
the wage gap measure of the impact of the minimum wage suggests
a sizeable impact as tables 4 and 5 indicate a 2.4% and 2% increase
in the weekly wage bill for the full and balanced sample respectively
for the 1999 introduction as well as a 1.5% and 1.3% increase for
the full and balanced sample of homes respectively for 2001.
Therefore, in contrast to the changes in the average hourly wage
between the pre and post introduction and increase surveys dis-
cussed in the previous section, the measures of the ‘bite’ of the
NMW suggest a stronger impact of the minimum wage on the wage
structure for the 1999 introduction compared to the 2001 increase,
something not surprising if one accounts that in 1999 the NMW was
introduced in a previously unregulated labour market.22
22Note that ‘bite’ statistics presented in table 4 and 5 are diﬀerent (especially for the
proportion of aﬀected workers) than those presented by MW (2004). The diﬀerence can be
mainly explained by two points: The one is that diﬀerence in the way the two measures of the
impact of the NMW were calculated. As suggested by MMR (1999), the data were punched
in the computer by various students, and that is why we had a closer look for any errors in the
variables of interest. In particular, MMR and MW use two diﬀerent measures for the impact
14The summary statistics presented in table 3 and 4 also suggest a
noticeable spike of the wage distribution on the adult rate as around
24% of all workers in both the full and balanced sample for the 1999
and around 20% and 18% of all workers in the full and balanced
sample respectively for 2001 are paid the adult rate after the NMW
introduction/increase. The spike of the wage distribution on the
minimum wage is one of the main stylized facts of the minimum
wage literature (Brown 1999).23
The “bite statistics” combined with the spike at the adult rate of
the post-1999 and 2001 youth hourly wage distributions presented in
ﬁgures 11 and 12 seem to support a low utilisation of youth submin-
imum wages, another well-documented fact of the minimum wage
literature.24
T h es p i k eo ft h ew a g ed i s t r i b u t i o na tt h ea d u l tr a t ei sc l e a r l y
observed in ﬁgures 14 and 16 (see ﬁgures section at the end) of the
hourly wage distribution for all workers in the post 1999 NMW in-
troduction and post 2001 NMW period respectively. More compar-
isons the hourly wage distribution before and after the 1999 NMW
introduction (ﬁgure 13 and 14) and 2001 NMW increase (ﬁgure 15
and 16) suggests clear compression of the distribution of hourly
of the minimum wage: the proportion of workers whose wage is aﬀe c t e db yt h em i n i m u m
wage (covered workers that are paid an hourly wage that is below the age speciﬁcm i n i m u m
rate before the NMW introduction and increase) and the wage gap (the proportional increase
in the weekly wage bill at home if the wages of workers aﬀected is increased to meet the
age speciﬁc minimum wage). We calculate the proportion of aﬀected by the minimum wage
workers as the ratio of the number of workers with information on whether they are covered
and aﬀected (i.e. whether they are paid below their age-speciﬁc minimum rate) to all workers
with information on whether they are aﬀected or not by the NMW. The same approach is
used in the calculation of the sample values of the wage gap variable. A comparison of the
minimum wage impact variables calculated as described above with those calculated by MW
(which were included in the data sent to us by the authors), seems to suggest that the former
take into account more information and that is why their values are noticeably diﬀerent than
the latter (for example we account those that are not covered, i.e. those below 18 years
old and those paid above the adult rate as not aﬀected even in the case where there is not
information on their hourly wage and age respectively). Moreover, the diﬀerence between our
“bite statistics” and that presented in MW could be also attributed to the diﬀerences in the
size of the sample of all care homes from the south coast of England. In particular, MW report
statistics based on a sample of 530 and 581 carehomes in the whole sample in the pre and
post 1999 survey respectively, whereas our ﬁgures are derived from a sample of 548 and 579
homes respectively. Moreover, for 2001 MW report a pre and post NMW increase sample of
482 and 404 respectively whereas our analysis was based on 411 and 333 homes respectively.
Moreover, our analysis of the balanced sample of homes is based on 195 homes in 1999 and
152 homes in 2001 respectively, whereas MW report statistics and estimates from a sample of
181 and 173 homes for 1999 and 2001 respectively.
23Once more and for the reasons explained above, the our measures of the spike at the adult
rate slightly diﬀer from those presented by MW 2004).
24Note that out of 827 employees from the full sample and of 275 from the balanced sample
that are covered by the development rate only 41 and 14 employees respectively are paid
exactly the youth rate after the 1999 NMW introduction. Similarly 11 out of 390 employees
in the full sample and 1 out of 178 covered by the development rate are paid this rate after
the 2001 NMW increase.
15wages which is also consistent with ﬁndings presented by Dickens
and Manning (2004), supporting the argument that minimum wages
decreased wage inequality in the care home sector.
Following the above discussion, the next question to be addressed
is whether the highest wage changes occurred at homes that were
aﬀected the most by the minimum wage.
The basic empirical speciﬁcation used throughout is
∆Oht = α0 + α1MINh,t−1 + α2Xh,t−1 + εht (1)
where ∆Oht measures the change in the outcome of interest, O,
for home h in period t before and after the minimum wage intro-
duction/increase. MINh,t−1 is the pre-minimum wage variable, X is
a set of pre-minimum wage home characteristics and εht is a random
error.
As long as the minimum wage randomly assigns the population
of carehomes into more and less aﬀected the parameter α1is a true
measure of the eﬀect of the minimum wage on the outcome of inter-
est. The main concern about the validity of the latter identiﬁcation
assumption is that, given that the NMW is set at the same level
nationally, variation in the minimum wage impact measures comes
from variation in initial wages. MMR test this identifying condi-
tion by looking whether there is any (or a diﬀerent) relationship
between initial wages or minimum wage impact measures and the
change in the outcome of interest (in particular the change in wages
and the change in employment) in a period where no NMW was
introduced.25 The main ﬁndings indicate that there is no or little
relationship between initial starting wages and the minimum wage
impact measures and the change in the wages and employment, and
that these relationships have signiﬁcantly shifted at the time of the
1999 NMW introduction.26
In table 5 we present estimation results from wage speciﬁcations
with dependent variable the change in the log average hourly and
change in the log weekly wage respectively. We ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of both the 1999 introduction and 2001 increase
in the minimum wage on the change in average hourly wage, that
persists throughout all speciﬁcations and measures of the minimum
wage impact.
As t r i k i n gﬁnding is that our estimates suggest that the 2001
NMW increase had a signiﬁcantly larger impact on care homes av-
25The counterfactual was the South Coast care home sample surveyed the responded in the
two surveys for data collection in the window of the 92/92 UK elections.
26This ﬁnding limits any concerns of endogenous variation in the minimum wage impact
measures due to variation in initial wages across homes. The introduciton of controls for
home and employers characteristics further limits any variation in the minimum wage impact
measures that is generated from variation in initial wages.
16erage hourly wages compared to the 1999 NMW introduction.27 This
ﬁnding may not seem surprising if we consider the changes in the
average hourly and weekly wages before and after the 1999 intro-
duction and 2001 increase discussed in the previous section but it
may seem if one considers the measures of the ‘bite’ of the NMW
for the period of the introduction and the increase which suggest
that the NMW was more binding in 1999 compared to 2001. How-
ever, the descriptive analysis of the ‘bite’ of the NMW does not
necessarily contradict the regression analysis of wages as the two
are complements for each other.
In particular, the interpretation of estimates of speciﬁcation (1)
from both the 98/99 and 01/02 samples suggests that a home that
has 1% higher proportion of aﬀected employees experienced on av-
erage a 0.12% higher growth on hourly wages after the 1999 NMW
introduction compared to a 0.26 % higher hourly wage growth after
the 2001 NMW increase. The same is the case if one compares esti-
mates from speciﬁcations that include the wage gap as the minimum
wage impact measure. Particularly estimates from speciﬁcations (3)
of both samples indicate that a home with a 1% higher increase in
its weekly wage bill after the 1999 NMW introduction will experi-
ence on average 1.2% higher hourly wage growth compared to 3.7%
hourly wage growth after the 2001 NMW increase.
The latter result seems to be against conventional wisdom as one
wouldn’t expect that the NMW increase would have had greater
impact on wages compared to the NMW introduction to a previ-
ously unregulated labour market. Moreover, this result is also dif-
ferent than the ﬁndings of MW, who although they also ﬁnd positive
and signiﬁcant wage eﬀects of the NMW introduction and increase
throughout speciﬁcations and minimum wage measures, they report
higher wage estimates for the 1999 NMW introduction compared to
the 2001 NMW increase from the sample of care homes from the
south coast of England.
A potential explanation of this ﬁnding (except of the diﬀerences
between our analysis and that conducted by MW in terms of sam-
ple sizes and minimum wage measures) may be that although at the
period of the introduction the NMW ﬂo o rw a ss e ti nap r e v i o u s l yu n -
regulated labour market, its level is quite prudent as also suggested
by the Low Pay Commission reports (LPC) (June 1998, February
2000), probably because of fears of employment losses. Moreover,
the 2001 increase is the most generous to date, because the levels
were set after detailed research and consultation as well as after
27For the 98/99 balanced sample our estimates are slightly diﬀerent than MW, which could
be explained by the diﬀerence in the measures of the minimum wage impact and the sample
size discussed above as well as the fact that we use imputed information for missing values
of the controls included in regressions as well as missing value dummies so that to avoid
reductions in the sample.
17taking into account previous experience of the NMW increases that
may have limited concerns of employment losses.
Furthermore, as presented by table 5 we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
minimum wage on the growth of average weekly wage is positive
but insigniﬁcant throughout all speciﬁcations and minimum wage
measures for the 98/99 sample and positive but usually in the fringe
of statistical signiﬁcance for the 01/02 sample.
Once more we ﬁnd that the NMW 2001 increase had a more
sizeable impact on the change in the log weekly wage across homes.
Moreover, our ﬁndings in this case diﬀer from those of MMR(2003)
who found that the NMW not only had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on both
hourly and weekly wages but also that the eﬀects were very similar
in magnitude across care homes from all areas of the UK.28
An explanation of our ﬁndings of a weaker minimum wage eﬀect
on weekly compared to hourly wages could be that although the
hourly wage may have increased as a result of the minimum wage,
number of hours may have changed as well but in the opposite direc-
tion (this hypothesis is investigated in a following section) leading
to lower weekly wage increases than those expected if hours were
not aﬀected by the policy.
In conclusion in this section we present evidence of signiﬁcant
positive eﬀects of minimum wage on wages, and thus we can now
look for eﬀects of minimum wages on other outcomes starting from
the employment eﬀects, the most heavily researched hypothesis in
the minimum wage literature.
4.2 Employment Eﬀects
In this section we look at the eﬀects of the NMW on employ-
ment. In particular, we investigate the eﬀects of the 1999 NMW
introduction and increase on both the number of employees and on
total hours in the care homes sector.29
Results on the change in log number of employees and change
in log total weekly hours for both the 98/99 and 01/02 periods are
presented in table 6.
First of all we ﬁnd that the NMW eﬀects on the change in the
number of employees are negative and signiﬁcant for the period of
the 99 introduction only when the proportion of low-paid is used
28In our case, even when the NMW eﬀect son weekly wages are signiﬁc a n t( a si ti st h ec a s e
for the 01/02) their magnitude is lower than the NMW eﬀects on hourly wages.
29MW report estimates of the eﬀects of both the NMW introduction and increase for only
one employment measure. It is not clear whether this measure is the number of employees or
total hours but considering the similarity of their estimates for the 98/99 from the sample of
care homes from all UK areas used also by MMR, with MMRs estimates using the number
employed as the the employment measure, we infer that MW results involve the number
of employees. The investigation of the eﬀects on both bodies and hours is important as
employment adjustments may involve both bodies and hours.
18as the measure of the impact of the minimum wage, whereas it is
negative but insigniﬁcant when the wage gap is used as the minimum
wage measure.30 In particular, our estimate from speciﬁcation (1) in
the upper panel of table 6 which reports estimates for the eﬀect of
the 1999 NMW introduction, suggests that a home with 10% higher
proportion of aﬀected workers before the NMW 1999 introduction
will experience on average a 2.8% lower growth in the number of
employees.
As far as the eﬀects of the 2001 NMW increase in the change in
the log number of employees is concerned our estimates reported in
table 6 indicate that employment eﬀects are insigniﬁcant throughout
all speciﬁcations and all measures of the minimum wage impact
used. Interestingly, the estimated employment eﬀects are positive
in most of the cases.31 A g a i na si nt h ec a s eo fw a g ee ﬀects our results
are diﬀerent that those produced by MW as they ﬁnd negative and
most of the times insigniﬁcant employment eﬀects of the 2001 NMW
increase. Furthermore, MW’s estimates from the 98/99 sample of
homes from south coast suggests that their estimates are negative
and signiﬁcant but slightly diﬀerent than those presented in table 6.
Once more, diﬀerences in the estimated results could be attributed
in diﬀerences in the sample size, the minimum wages measures and
the use of imputed information for missing values and missing value
dummies for the controls included in regressions.
Furthermore, when the change in log total weekly hours is used
as the employment measure in regressions we ﬁnd a negative but
either insigniﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of the NMW 1999
introduction on employment.32 Once again we ﬁnd a positive and
insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the 2001 NMW increase in total weekly hours
to be the case in all speciﬁcations and under both measures of the
impact of the minimum wage.33
T h ef a c tt h a tw eﬁnd some negative eﬀects of the 1999 NMW
introduction on the change in weekly hours is consistent with the
above result of a weaker positive eﬀect of the NMW introduction
on weekly wages. Moreover, in the case of the 2001 NMW increase
30A ss u g g e s t e db yM M R( 2 0 0 3 )a n dM W( 2 0 0 4 )b o t hm e a s u r e sw e r eu s e di nr e g r e s s i o n s ,a s
we cannot be sure which one is the best measure to pick up the eﬀect of the minimum wage.
31However, note that the NMW eﬀect on the number employed is negative and insigniﬁcant
when one accounts only for the employment of care assistants.
32Estimates are more strongly signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is the change in total
hours of care assistants.
33However, we ﬁnd some negative and sometimes on the fringe of statistical signiﬁcance
estimates when the dependent variable is the change in log total weekly hours of careassistants.
Because the hours of care assistants fell slightly as a result of the 2001 NMW increase one
could expect that total hours at home should also have fallen, if the hours of the rest of
workers were unaﬀected. We found that the NMW had a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on
the hours of non care assistants, and thus the positive and insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the 2001
increase on total hours of all employees may be probably explained by the fact that hours of
care assistants, as suggested by the overall results fell slightly.
19we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects on total weekly hours under
all speciﬁcations and minimum wage measures used, a ﬁnding which
further explains why the minimum wage increase had a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on weekly wages, considering also the positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀe c ti th a do nh o u r l yw a g e s . 34
All in all the evidence suggests that although the minimum wage
generated a signiﬁcant boost in the wages of care home workers,
there are some employment losses only in the period of its intro-
duction, a ﬁnding that is consistent with both previous studies con-
ducted by MMR and MW. On the other hand we fail to ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant (negative) employment eﬀects of the 2001 NMW increase,
a ﬁnding that seems quite surprising considering also the more size-
able impact that the 2001 NMW increase had on wages in care
homes.
This latter ﬁnding is surprising, as provided the evidence that the
2001 NMW increase generated on average a more signiﬁcant boost
in hourly and weekly wages than the 1999 NMW introduction, we
would expect more signiﬁcant disemployment eﬀects of the 2001
NMW increase compared to the 1999 NMW introduction. However,
a better explanation of the observed employment eﬀects of the NMW
introduction and increase could be provided once we also get some
evidence of the eﬀects on other outcomes as at the same time other
adjustments may have taken place.
T h en e g a t i v em i n i m u mw a g ee m p l o y m e n te ﬀects of 1999 seem to
be quite moderate, considering the impact that the minimum wage
had on the wage sector of the care homes sector. An explanation
of the moderate or no employment eﬀect of the NMW introduction
and increase, could be provided by the claim of the low pay com-
mission (Low Pay Commission 1998) that “a detailed investigation-
consultation across the country takes place before any wage increase
so that the rates will be calculated and set at a prudent level that
will make sure that there is a boost in low-wage workers incomes
that doesn’t destroy their jobs”.
In general, our ﬁndings are in line with MMR and MW that sug-
gest that a minimum wage introduction and increase boosts low-paid
workers earnings and cause little or no harm in their employment
34The fact that we found some evidence (not presented in the regressions of table 7) that
the hours for care assistants fell slightly whereas the number of all employees and the number
of all employees and the number of careassistants in particular didn’t change signiﬁcantly
after the NMW 2001 increase may explain why the NMW eﬀects on hourly wages are larger
in magnitude and more signiﬁcant than that of weekly wages.
205T h e E ﬀects of the UK National Minimum Wage
on Other Outcomes
In the following sections we present our ﬁndings on the eﬀects on
the NMW 2001 increase on other outcomes such as prices, labour
productivity and eﬀo r ta sw e l la st h ee ﬀects of both the 1999 NMW
introduction and increase on proﬁts and long-run outcomes as the
skill composition of workforce and capital/labour relative utilisa-
tion.35 Moreover, we also look at any NMW eﬀects on supervision
intensity and other oﬀsets that are predicted by eﬃciency wages as
changes in employees’ quality, tenure and turnover.
O u rm a i no b j e c t i v e sa r e :t oe x t e n dM W ’ sa n a l y s i st h a tf o c u s e d
on wages, employment and closures and in this way to look for
other possible adjustments that may have been the result of mini-
mum wage increases; to investigate the eﬀects of the minimum wage
policy in the long run and thus provide a credible attempt to ﬁll
an important gap of the literature; and ﬁnally to test one the main
premise of our thesis that eﬃciency wages considerations may be
particularly relevant in low wage labour markets by looking into
some of the implications of the theoretical model we developed in
c h a p t e r2 ,a sw e l la st h ei m p l ications of other seminal eﬃciency
wages models (Salop 1979, Weiss 1980, 1990).
5.1 Prices
The eﬀects of the minimum wage on product prices of low wage
ﬁrms consist another important gap of the minimum wage literature
(Card and Krueger 1995, Brown 1999). MMR investigated the ef-
fects of the 1999 NMW introduction on average weekly price of bed
in their sample of care homes across the UK and ﬁnd no evidence
of price eﬀects. This ﬁnding was explained by the fact that there
is a signiﬁcant proportion of care homes residents for whom the
price of services is regulated by local authorities and thus cannot be
freely adjusted by the owners of care homes. This is actually one of
the characteristics that rendered the care homes sector an ideal one
to study the eﬀects of the NMW, as discussed by MMR and MW.
In fact, further information provided by local authorities indicates
that local authorities/social security funding didn’t increase after
the 1999 NMW introduction and that is why care homes couldn’t
35The eﬀects of the 1999 NMW introduction on prices, labour productivity and eﬀort have
been investigated by MMR (2003). MW investigated the eﬀect of the NMW 1999 on home
closures, as discussed in section 3. When we reproduced the same investigation using the
data from the south coast subsample of care homes for 1999 we ﬁnd very similar results as
MMR and MW and thus we exclude the presentation of these results from our analysis. In the
following sections we present our ﬁndings if they have not been investigated by existing studies
or if they have been investigated by existing studies, but they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
21pass on the increased wage costs generated by the NMW introduc-
tion to prices (see MMR 2002).
However, MW present no evidence of price eﬀects of the 2001
NMW increase on care homes from the south coast of England. This
evidence is important as they could cast further light on the overall
impact of the 2001 NMW increase in the care homes sector and
could also provide a better picture of any possible oﬀsets generated
by minimum wage increases.
Estimates of minimum wage eﬀects on the change in log average
weekly price of bed of south coast care homes are presented in table
7. Estimates of the price eﬀects of the NMW 2001 increase are
not in line with those from the 1999 introduction. In particular,
we ﬁnd that prices grew faster in homes that were most aﬀected
by the minimum wage 2001 increase. For example as suggested by
the estimated results summarised in the right panel of table 7 the
average weekly price of bed growth was on average higher by 2.2%
in a home that had 10% more aﬀected employees or at a home that
experienced a 1% higher increase in the weekly wage bill as a result
of the minimum wage compared to other homes.
Information from local councils suggests that although prices of
care services provided by care homes are regulated by local authori-
ties, in contrast to the period before and after the 1999 introduction,
t h e r ew a s n ’ ta n yp r i c ec a p p i n gi nt h ep e r i o db e f o r ea n da f t e rt h e
2001 NMW increase.36
Therefore, based on evidence on price eﬀects of the NMW 2001
increase we may infer that although prices were capped for the pe-
riod around the 1999 NMW introduction, the same wasn’t probably
t h ec a s ef o rt h e2 0 0 1N M Wa n dt h u st h eN M Wi n c r e a s eg e n e r a t e d
substantial increases in the average price of services of residential
care homes.
5.2 Proﬁts
Most theoretical models developed to analyse the eﬀects of the
minimum wage policy in low-wage labour markets or low-wage in-
dustries generate predictions on the eﬀects of minimum wages on
proﬁts. However, few empirical studies investigate the eﬀects of min-
imum wages on proﬁts (Card and Krueger 1995, Brown 1999). Fur-
36This information is further supported by the fact that we fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the proportion of dss residents on price growth. The same is the case for an interaction
variables of minimum wage impact measures and the proportion of residents at home whose
fees are not paid by local authorities. These results suggests that we ﬁnd no evidence that
price increases in 2001 were the result of increases only in the price of services for residents for
whom fees are not covered by local authorities, because of local authority funding capping that
restricted care homes managers/owners to pass on wage costs to residents with fees covered
by local authorities.
22thermore, the two previous care homes studies produced by MMR
and MW do not address this issue.
In this section we are investigating the eﬀects of the NMW 1999
introduction and 2001 increase on trading surplus, which is our
proxy for proﬁts.37 As suggested by results reported in table 8, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in the trading surplus rate of care homes
between the period of pre minimum and post minimum wage intro-
duction and increase, a result which again persists across speciﬁca-
tions and minimum wage measures used.
The main diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀects of the mini-
mum wage introduction and increase on the trading surplus of care
homes was that estimates from the 98/99 sample are positive and
insigniﬁcant, whereas those from 01/02 sample are negative and in-
signiﬁcant. However, estimates from 98/99 should be more reliable,
compared to those from 01/02 because in the latter case there wasn’t
suﬃcient information in order to use an unbiased measure of trading
surplus.
In general, as far as the 1999 NMW introduction is concerned
we ﬁnd that there is a substantial increase in wage costs across
homes followed by some small reduction in employment (in hours
and bodies) and no change in the price of service, ﬁndings which may
suggest that we should expect that signiﬁcant eﬀect of the NMW
1999 introduction on proﬁts should have been observed.
Nevertheless, in order to provide a better explanation on the ef-
fects on proﬁts it is better to look also for other possible adjustments
in care homes that may have taken place, as substitution of produc-
tion inputs and changes in eﬀort or productivity across homes.
5.3 Long Run Eﬀects
As suggested above more evidence on the long-run eﬀects of
minimum wages is needed. As far as the NMW eﬀects in the care
homes sector MMR and MW investigated the relationship between
homes exit and entry and the NMW introduction but failed to ﬁnd
any systematic relationship between the minimum wage and homes
closures or openings.
In this section we are looking for evidence on long-run adjust-
ments as a response to the NMW, such as substitution of capital
and higher skilled for lower skilled labour. These issues haven’t
been investigated by the main previous studies of the eﬀects of the
NMW.
Theoretical models often used to predict the impact of the mini-
mum wage on labour market outcomes suggest that in the long-run a
minimum wage increase may cause substitution of capital (or higher
37See notes of table 9 for details of how trading surplus was calculated.
23skilled labour) for lower skilled aﬀe c t e dl a b o u ro rv i c ev e r s a .I no r -
der to test these predictions we estimate speciﬁcations where the
dependent variable is the log number of beds to number of employ-
ees and log number of beds to number of total weekly hours of work
at home ratio,38 and the ratio of skilled (proportion of employees
with nursing qualiﬁcation) to unskilled employees (those with no
qualiﬁcation, as nursing qualiﬁcation is the only relevant qualiﬁca-
tion in the industry).
As indicated in the upper panel of table 9 we ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the NMW 1999 introduction on the number of
beds per employee and on the number of beds per weekly hour of
work which are our proxies for the capital/labour ratio, only for
speciﬁcations that include the proportion of aﬀected workers as the
minimum wage measure. Moreover, as suggested by the upper and
lower panel of table 9 we ﬁnd no eﬀect of the 2001 NMW increase in
the change in the number of beds per employee or per weekly hour
of work.
G i v e no u rr e s u l t so nt h ee ﬀects of the NMW 1999 introduction
and 2001 increase on the employment in bodies and in hours pre-
sented in table 6, it is very likely that the results of the eﬀects of
t h eN M Wo nt h er a t i oo fb e d sp e re m p l o y e eo rp e rw e e k l yh o u r
are driven by the changes on the two measures of employment gen-
erated by the changes in the NMW. This explanation is supported
further by estimation results of the eﬀect of the impact of the NMW
introduction and increase on the log number of beds presented in
the lower panel of table 11.
As indicated in the lower panel of table 11, we do not ﬁnd evi-
dence of any minimum wage eﬀe c to nt h ec h a n g ei nt h en u m b e ro f
beds in care homes for both the 98/99 and 01/02 periods. Therefore,
the evidence suggests that overall there was no change in the cap-
ital/labour ratio as measured by the number of beds per employee
or per weekly hour of work that can be attributed to substitution
of capital for labour for both the period of the NMW introduction
and increase.
Furthermore, table 10 presents estimation results for the eﬀects
of the NMW on the ratio of employees with nursing qualiﬁcation
to employees with no nursing qualiﬁcation, which is a proxy of the
ratio of high to low skilled labour at home. Again we fail to ﬁnd
any evidence of changes in the relative utilisation of skilled labour,
as suggested by the estimates presented in table 10.39
38The main justiﬁc a t i o no ft h eu s eo ft h en u m b e ro fb e d si st h a tt h i si st h eo n l yc a p i t a l
information included in the 98/99 and 01/02 care homes data.
39We also looked for any changes in the employment of employees with nursing qualiﬁcation
relative to those with no qualiﬁcation in terms of hours. We ﬁnd an increase in the hours of
qualiﬁed employees only for the 98/99 sample and only in the same speciﬁcations for which
as i g n i ﬁcant employment eﬀect in terms of hours of all workers or all care assistants was
24All in all, the evidence in this section suggests that home own-
ers/managers didn’t increase the number of beds relative to employ-
ment measured in bodies or in hours in order to oﬀset some of the
costs generated by the minimum wage.
Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence of any minimum wage eﬀect on the
change in the skill-composition of workforce in care homes in the
98/99 and in the 01/02 sample. Again a potential explanation of
the lack of any evidence that suggests substitution between factors
of production may be that the post-introduction and post- increase
surveys conducted relative close to the time of the intervention and
thus it is not likely that long-run adjustments as that of substitution
between factors of production may have occurred.
5.4 Output, Workers Productivity and Eﬀort
In the upper panel of table 11 are presented estimation results
from speciﬁcations with dependent variable the change in the nat-
ural logarithm of the number of residents (a measure of care homes
output) at home in 98/99 and 01/02 periods.
Results suggest that the change in the NMW had no eﬀect on
output as measured by the number of residents at home, except of
the case of the 1999 NMW introduction and only when the propor-
tion of aﬀected workers at home is the measure of the impact of
the minimum wage, where we ﬁnd that output fell as a result of
the introduction. The pattern of the NMW output eﬀects resembles
closely that of the NMW employment eﬀects as measured by the
number of employees and total weekly hours of work.40
Table 12 summarises the results from the estimation of various
speciﬁcations with dependent variable the change in employees pro-
ductivity as measured by the number of residents in home per em-
ployee and the number of residents per weekly hour of work and
employer’s perception of changes in eﬀort as a result of the NMW
2001 increase.41
produced. This suggests that any evidence of relative increase in the hours of work of more
qualiﬁed employees is not due to substitution of of these workers for workers with no nursing
qualiﬁcation but mainly because of the reduction in the hours of work of low-skilled workers.
However, results from regressions of the change in the total hours of employees with nursing
qualiﬁcation to those with no qualiﬁcation are likely not to be so robust as infromation was
quite patchy.
40Taking into account both the results on the NMW eﬀects on the number of residents
and the number of beds presented in table 13, we can infer that the NMW introduction and
increase had no signifcant eﬀect on the occupancy rate in the care home sector.
41The data collected before and after the 2001 NMW increase do not include information
on the number of residents but only the number of residents whose costs are paid by local
authorities and the department of social security. Information on the change in eﬀort is based
on homes managers/owners subjective answers to questions on whether or not work eﬀort
changed as a result of the NMW introduction and increase and if eﬀort has changed, whether
it decreased or increased (see MMR 2002 for the questions included in the questionnaire used
25Estimates presented in the upper and middle panels of table 12
suggest that the 2001 NMW increase had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
either the change in the log number of residents per employee or
the change in log number of residents per weekly hour of work in
care homes. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results of MMR
that ﬁnd no eﬀects of the NMW 1999 introduction on the number
of residents per weekly hour of work. This can be also inferred by
the similar patterns in the number of employees and weekly hours
and the number of residents for 1999 presented in tables 6 and 11
respectively.
In general evidence of wage eﬀects on employees’ productivity is
of essence for the validity of eﬃciency wages. However, in this case
the fact that we ﬁnd no evidence of any NMW eﬀects on labour
productivity across care homes should be interpreted with caution as
this evidence can be mostly viewed as minimum wage eﬀects on the
relative change of output and employment rather than as minimum
wage eﬀects on the change of employees’ productive behaviour which
is a necessary condition for the validity of eﬃciency wages.
Therefore, this evidence does not particularly mean that because
output per worker hasn’t changed implies that employees’ produc-
t i v eb e h a v i o u r( f o re x a m p l et h ei n t e n s i t yb yw h i c he m p l o y e e sw o r k )
hasn’t also changed, as it may be the case that when employment
fell, the fall was such that more than oﬀs e ta ni n c r e a s ei ne m p l o y -
ees eﬀort and in this way may have led to output reductions per
employee or per hour of work.
We now turn to the eﬀects of the NMW on eﬀort across care
homes. The lower panel of table 12 presents ordered probit estimates
of the eﬀects of the NMW introduction and increase on subjective
responses of homes owners/managers about changes in work eﬀort.42
Results suggest that the NMW hadn oi m p a c to nt h ep r o b a b i l i t y
that eﬀort will be increased relative to that of being decreased for the
04/02 balanced sample of care homes. MMR found similar results
for the NMW 4999 introduction.
Again this evidence shouldn’t be interpreted as being against of
the validity of eﬃciency wages as ﬁrst of all the information on
eﬀort is subjective and second there may be other realised gains
arising from the NMW introduction and increase. We looked into
this question in the next section.
In summary, the investigation of the eﬀects of the NMW intro-
for the data collection).
42The eﬀort speciﬁcation we used in the ordered probit estimation is the empirical coun-
terpart of the non-shirking condition for continuous eﬀort derived in our theoretical model of
chapter 2. Note that according to the theoretical speciﬁcation of NSC supervision intensity
should be also included as one of the explanatory variables in the eﬀort empirical speciﬁcation.
However, as we also show below, supervision intensity is endogenous and is correlated with
the minimum wage measures and that is why we exclude it here.
26duction and increase on output, labour productivity and subjective
eﬀort in care homes produces some evidence of a fall in output after
the 4999 NMW introduction and no evidence of eﬀects of the 2004
NMW increase on output, labour productivity and eﬀort. However,
as discussed above this evidence does not imply anything about any
eﬀects the minimum wage may have had on employees productive
behaviour in particular, and that is why in the next section we
are investigating this issue by looking whether the NMW generated
other gains in terms of reduction in costs associated with person-
nel practices in homes such as supervision or in terms of employees’
quality.
5.5 Supervision
The main objective of this paper is to test empirically the va-
lidity of the hypothesis that eﬃciency wages considerations may be
particularly valid in low wage labour markets, by testing the predic-
tion of the shirking models of eﬃciency wages of a wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ.
In this analysis the design of both surveys enables us to address
probably the most important problem that hinders the identiﬁca-
tion of the relationship between wages and supervision, namely the
endogeneity bias. Moreover, the choice of the care homes sector
which is non unionised, with relatively homogeneous occupations
and skills but also homogeneous services (MMR 2003), signiﬁcantly
abates other concerns and problems generated by unobserved het-
erogeneity.
Additionally, the fact that we have observations on the variables
of interest at two diﬀerent points in time allows us also to control
for time invariant unobserved factors that are correlated with super-
vision intensity and wages, including also measurement error that
is another problem that makes the identiﬁcation of the relationship
between wages and supervision particularly vexing.43
Supervision intensity and wages are both choices of the ﬁrm and
in a regression of wages on supervision it is expected that unobserved
factors that aﬀect wages will be also correlated with supervision in-
tensity.44 Another important issue is concerned with the direction
of the endogeneity bias. The sign of the bias depends on the rela-
43The empirical literature of the wage-supervision relationship suggests that the problem of
measurement is particularly related to supervision intensity, as the measure of most often in
the literature is the ratio of supervisors to staﬀ that may overestimate the extent of monitoring
as supervisors may not all the time monitor employees but just simply coordinate and guide
them on the job (Rebitzer 1995). Moreover, the supervisor to staﬀ ratio does not pick up any
diﬀerences in the quality of monitoring across care homes (Brunello 1995).
44The same holds if one regresses supervision on wages as the determination of both wages
and supervision by the employer can be modeled using a simultaneous equations model.
27tionship of omitted variables with wages and supervision. Moreover,
the identiﬁcation of the main confounding factors and the nature of
their relationship with wages and supervision is usually speciﬁed by
the rational or theory underlying the determination of wages and
supervision.
For example under the rationale provided by eﬃciency wages
models, eﬀort is increasing in the wage and supervision and thus
in equilibrium, provided that everything else is constant there is a
trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision. If the relationship between
wages and supervision is as predicted by eﬃciency wages, then we
would expect that the omission of factors that aﬀect eﬀort inten-
sity across establishments will cause a positive bias because ﬁrms
that require their workers to work harder will set supervision and
wages at a higher level. Similarly, again under the eﬃciency wages
assumption that wages and supervision are eﬀort regulating devices,
we expect that ﬁrms which have better employment practices or use
other motivation devices as well will pay lower wages and supervise
workers less stringently, to achieve a given eﬀort target (Rebitzer
4995).
A n o t h e rf a c t o rt h a tm a ya l s oc a u s ea nu p w a r db i a si nt h er e -
lationship of interest is unobserved diﬀerences in eﬀort technology
across ﬁrms, for example because of the systems that govern labour-
management relations that may make eﬀort more responsive in wage
and supervision in some ﬁrms (Gordon 4990, 4994).
On the other hand other theories of the wage-supervision deter-
mination specify diﬀerent omitted factors of interest and predict a
negative bias. This is the case if it is true that better quality workers,
which are paid higher wages, are supervised less stringently because
they need less guidance and coordi n a t i o no nt h ej o b .A c c o r d i n gt o
this “sorting by ability” model (Groshen and Krueger 4990), unob-
served workers’ quality will cause a negative bias in the relationship
of interest.
Another explanation of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ which again
makes an assumption about workers’ (not union’s) preferences on
supervision can be provided by the “equalizing diﬀerences” theory
that predicts that if workers like supervision, because for example
supervision helps them to achieve career goals (Groshen and Krueger
4990), then they will be willing to receive lower wages if they will be
supervised tighter (i.e. they will receive a negative wage-diﬀerential
as supervision is regarded as a good working condition).
Our analysis in this section uses a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strat-
egy than the previous sections, as we use the minimum wage as an
instrument to obtain IV-2SLS estimates of the structural parame-
ter of the change in wages on the change in supervision intensity
and in this way to test the prediction of the shirking model that in
equilibrium there is a trade-oﬀ between wages and supervision.
28In particular, a simple structural model of the change in super-
vision is derived from Georgiadis (2004) that extends the standard
Shapiro-Stiglitz (4984) shirking model to allow for endogenously de-
termined supervision intensity. The structural model is given by
equation (2):
∆Sit = β0 + β4∆lnWit + β2Ψi,t−4 + uit (2)
where ∆Sit is the change in supervision intensity, ∆Wit is the
change in the natural logarithm of the hourly wage at home and
measured as the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees
between the pre and post NMW introduction/increase period, Ψi,t−4
is a vector of ﬁrms and workers’ characteristics that also determine
the intensity of supervision45 and uit is a random error. In order
to derive the reduced form of model (2),we substitute the following
reduced form equation that expresses the change in the wage as a
linear function of the instrument MINi,t−4and the control variables
of model (2). The latter reduced form model is given by equation
(3):
∆lnWit = γ0 + γ4MINi,t−4 + γ2Ψi,t−4 + vit (3)
where MINi,t−4 is a measure of the impact of the minimum wage
in the pre-NMW introduction/increase period (either the proportion
of workers aﬀe c t e do rt h ew a g eg a p )a n dvit is an error term. Sub-
stituting ∆lnWit from (3) into (2) we derive the estimable reduced
form supervision change equation of the form:
∆Sit = δ0 + δ4MINi,t−4 + δ2Ψi,t−4 + ξit (4)
where ξit is a random error.
Therefore we are able to estimate parameter β4 by using MINi,t−4
as an instrument for ∆lnWit in model (2). In this particular case
(when there is only one instrument) it could be shown that β4 = δ4
γ4,
and thus an estimate of β4 can be derived by estimating models (3)
and (4) and calculate the ratio of the OLS estimates of δ4 and γ4.46
45These characteristics aim to pick up heterogeneity in the quit rate, the probability of
ﬁnding a job once a worker is dismissed and the time preference rate across homes, which are
determinants of the intensity of supervision according to the theoretical model
46The main identifying assumptions of the IV is that the instrument is correlated with the
endogenous variable of interest a n du n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h ee r r o r term. Results from the esti-
mation of wage change equations in one of the previous sections indicate a strong correlation
of minimum wage impact measures and the change in the wage and thus seem to support
that the minimum wage is a strong instrument for the change in the wage. Moreover, MMR’s
test discussed previously seems also to support the fact that variation in the minimum wage
measures is exogenous which further supports the instrument exogeneity condition. Finally,
we expect that there is no concern that the instrument would aﬀect the change in supervision
through another channel than that of the change in hourly wages, as the minimum wage is a
pure exogenous wage increase.
29Firstly, we are interested in investigating the direction of the
endogeneity bias. This is why we compare estimation results from
OLS regressions of the change in supervision intensity on the change
in log average wage across homes surveyed before and after the 4999
NMW introduction and 2004 NMW increase, with two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimates of the relationship between supervision
and wages.
In table 13 we present comparisons of two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation results with OLS estimates using the same spec-
iﬁcations for the 98/99 and 04/02 samples when the instrument for
the change in the average wage is the proportion of aﬀected work-
ers (upper panel) and the wage gap (lower panel) respectively. In
both the upper and the lower panels OLS estimates of the eﬀect
of change in the wage on the change in supervision intensity are in
their vast majority positive and signiﬁc a n t .T h i sr e s u l ti sc o n s i s t e n t
with the prediction of our theoretical model that the relationship
between wages and supervision is positive, when everything else is
not constant.47
As indicated in table 13, two—stage least squares estimates are
systematically smaller (not in absolute value) than the correspond-
ing OLS estimates and in some speciﬁcations are turning to negative
and signiﬁcant. The former result supports the prediction of a pos-
itive endogeneity bias. The wage-supervision trade-oﬀ is signiﬁcant
for the 98/99 sample when the proportion of aﬀected workers is used
as an instrument for the change in average wage48 and marginally
signiﬁcant when the wage gap is the selected instrument49 and when
also controls for employees and home characteristics, including con-
trols for turnover, eﬀort and monitoring costs.
Furthermore, for the 04/02 sample although we do ﬁnd evidence
of a negative OLS bias we fail to ﬁnd any negative and signiﬁcant
estimates of the relationship of the change in supervision intensity
and the change in average hourly wage across homes.50
47In particular the prediction of our theoretical model (Geogiadis 2001) suggests that the
wage-supervision relationship is expected to be positive when eﬀort or/and employees’ quality
are not held constant. In other words, this latter prediction indicates the expected sign of
the endogeneity bias of OLS estimates of the wage-supervision relationship, when one fails
to control for eﬀort or/and employees’ quality diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Another eﬀort related
p o s i t i v eb i a sm a yb ep r o d u c e db yd i ﬀerences in eﬀort technology across homes, because in
homes that eﬀo r ti sm o r er e s p o n s i v ei ne ﬀort and supervision are expected to set both higher
wages and supervision levels. However, in general the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences of the supervisor
to staﬀ ratio may abate the OLS bias.
48A two-tailed test of the null hypothesis of no systematic relationship between the change
in supervision intensity and the change in average wage is rejected at 4.7% level of signiﬁcance,
whereas a one-tail test of the null where the alternative is that the relationship of interest is
negative rejects the null at 2.35% level of signiﬁcance.
49A one-tail test rejects the null at around 8% level of signiﬁcance.
50It may be the case that the lack of signiﬁcant results for the 01/02 sample is due to the
fact that less information is available compared to the 98/99 sample and thus less relevant
30As long as the 2SLS is a consistent estimator of the true relation-
ship between wages and supervision, we ﬁnd evidence of a wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ for the 98/99 sample, presented in table 13.
A negative relationship between wages and supervision is consistent
with three theories/rationales: a) eﬃciency wages, b) the ‘sorting by
ability’ model and c) “equalizing diﬀerences” under the assumption
that supervision is a ‘good’ working condition.51
If the ‘sorting by ability’ model consists the main explanation of
our results then we would expect that the OLS bias caused by un-
observed diﬀerences in workers’ quality across homes, would be neg-
ative,52 which is not the case here. Furthermore, unless unobserved
quality is uncorrelated with observed, we ﬁnd no evidence that un-
observed workers’ quality across homes causes a negative bias in
the estimate of interest, as suggested by the estimation results sum-
marised in table 13, where the inclusion of controls for workforce
quality characteristics (proportion female, proportion with nursing
qualiﬁcation, etc.) indicates that there is any unobserved quality
bias is positive rather than negative.53 Therefore, based on the lat-
ter arguments, one could probably dismiss the ‘sorting by ability’
interpretation of the negative wage-supervision relationship.
Finally, if “equalizing diﬀerences” consist the only or dominating
explanation of our ﬁndings, then we would expect that the direction
of the OLS bias will be negative and not positive, as if workers
‘like’ supervision then we would expect that lower wages are paid
in homes with higher supervision intensity.54 However, as discussed
above a positive OLS bias is the case here that further suggests that
if “equalizing diﬀerences” are true then this ﬁnding implies that
workers’ consider supervision as a ‘bad’ and not as a ‘good’ working
condition.
Therefore, again as suggested by the latter argument which is
based on our results on the direction of the endogeneity bias of OLS
controls are included in the regressions of the change in supervision.
51The wage-supervision trade-oﬀ can also be explained by diﬀerences in union bargaining
power, under union-ﬁrm bargaining over wages and supervision when unions bargain over
working conditions and eﬀort and when unions “like” wages but “dislike” supervision. How-
ever, in this case this theory does not apply as the care homes sector is non-unionised.
52This holds either because the ‘sorting by ability’ is the only underlying theory of the wage-
supervision relationship or because, even in the case the other theories are involved that lead
to positive biases, the sorting by ability is the dominating explanation and thus the negative
bias dominates.
53If the fact that the dependent variable includes dirst diﬀerences implies no concern for
unobserved workers quality, as care homes is a very homogenous sector, then the combination
of ﬁrst diﬀerences and of inclusion of worker’s quality controls should result in a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between wages and supervision, provided that the ‘sorting by ability’
model is true (see chapter 3 for detailed explanation).
54In other words, according to the ‘equalising diﬀerences’ explanation where supervision is a
‘good’ working condition, unobserved workers’ preferences over supervision suggest a negative
OLS bias.
31estimates, any “equalizing diﬀerences” explanations could be also
dismissed, as our ﬁndings imply that if workers’ preferences over
supervision are important for wage determination then it is more
likely for workers to“dislike” than to “like” supervision, which can-
not explain the negative relationship between wages and supervision
implied by our results.55
Thus, the above discussion may suggest that the evidence of a
wage-supervision trade-oﬀ should be interpreted as supporting the
hypothesis that wages and supervision intensity are eﬀort regulating
devices. The latter hypothesis is a prediction of eﬃciency wages or
agency theories in general, of which the eﬃciency wage theory is a
special case. An important feature of our analysis is that it addresses
two of the most important empirical problems of the estimation
of the wage-supervision relationship namely endogeneity bias and
observational equivalence of empirical results.
Additionally, Rebitzer (4995) suggested that except of endogene-
ity another problem that may hinder the identiﬁcation of the re-
lationship between wages and supervision is measurement error as
the ratio of supervisors to supervised may consistently overestimate
the intensity of supervision as supervisors may not have a solely
monitoring role in production.
According to this argument it may be the case that supervisors
are more skilled production workers that coordinate the activities of
lower-skilled workers, fact which further implies, as also emphasized
by Groshen and Krueger (4990) and Rebitzer (4995) that under
any production function that allows for a non-zero marginal rate
of substitution between inputs, an exogenous increase in the wage
(as it is the case here) will generate substitution of higher skilled
workers i.e. supervisors/managers for lower skilled-non-managerial
workers.
In our case the fact that we do not have accurate and detailed
supervision data may suggest that measurement error is a poten-
tial problem. However, the fact that in our case measurement error
concerns are related to the dependent and not the independent vari-
able of interest and the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences and of the two-stage
least squares estimation are expected to abate any measurement er-
ror problem. Moreover, in this case measurement error concerns
the dependent and not the independent variable, and thus if mea-
surement error in monitoring intensity consists a valid problem in
this case, then by standard econometric theory (Dougherty 2004)
we should expect that this will lead to consistent coeﬃcient esti-
mates but with larger standard errors. Therefore, in our case the
presence of measurement error on supervision makes our ﬁndings of
55Note also that again the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences may net out the eﬀect of unobserved
workers’ preferences on supervision which are expected to be relatively ﬁxed.
32a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ even more compelling.
As far as the potential substitution of supervisors for workers is
concerned, this may be a problem as the minimum wage generates
an exogenous increase in the wage of staﬀ relative to those of super-
visors. However, Groshen and Krueger (4990) suggest that as long
as the wage of supervisors varies independently of that of workers,
then substitution is not expected to be a problem.
In our case the situation described by Groshen and Krueger may
h o l da sf o re x a m p l ef o rt h e9 8 / 9 9s a m p l ew eﬁnd that the aver-
age hourly wage of managerial workers is $5.5 compared to non-
managerial workers for which the average hourly wage is $3.87,
which combined with the recent evidence that further suggests no
spill-over eﬀects of the NMW introduction (Dickens and Manning
2004), implies that the minimum wage may generate an indepen-
dent variation in the wages of non-managerial employees compared
to wages of managerial employees. This latter proposition is further
supported by the results (not reported here) from regressions of the
change in log average hourly wage of managerial workers on the two
measures of the NMW impact with or without controls for both
the 4999 introduction and 2004 increase which show no signiﬁcant
impact of the national minimum wage on the change in average
managerial wages, whereas a strongly and positive relationship is
the case for non-managerial wages and measures of the minimum
wage impact.
Moreover, the fact that in our previous analysis we failed to ﬁnd
any evidence of substitution of high for low-skilled employees in
bodies or even in hours, which may be explained by the argument
that no long-run eﬀects could have taken place during the time be-
tween the NMW introduction/increase and the post-minimum data-
collection, may further suggest that substitution may not be a prob-
lem in our case. Finally, if any substitution of supervisors for staﬀ
concerns remain valid even when the above conditions hold, the
fact that the substitution bias is expected to be positive, makes
our ﬁnding of a negative wage-supervision relationship even more
compelling and suggests that our estimates of the wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ are moderate estimates of the true relationship of interest.
Therefore, the evidence produced in this section provide support
to a negative relationship between wages and supervision intensity
across homes for the period surrounding the 4999 NMW introduc-
tion but no support of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ for the period of
the 2004 NMW increase.
The evidence from previous sections also imply that the NMW
both in 4999 and 2004 was binding, as suggested both by the survey
statistics presented in the previous section, where it is found that a
very large proportion of employees across care homes will be aﬀected
by the NMW introduction and increase and also that in the case
33that wages of aﬀected workers will be increased for employers to
comply with the law this will generate considerable increases in care
homes wage bill. In addition to the above evidence, the fact that in
4999 the NMW was introduced in a previously unregulated labour
market and that the 2004 increase was the most generous to date
(around 13.1% and 9 % increases in the adult and development rate
respectively) may provide further support to the fact that the NMW
had a signiﬁcant ‘bite’ in the care homes sector and thus increased
wages in the sector above the ‘market-clearing’ wage in this period.
Given also the estimation results presented earlier in this section
and the arguments used in order to sort-out alternative theoretical
explanations of the wage-supervision trade-oﬀ, the evidence of the
trade-oﬀ could be interpreted as that wages and supervision are sub-
stitutes in eliciting productive behaviour by employees. Combining
the latter two points the evidence could be interpreted as support-
ing a fundamental assumption of eﬃciency wages (and in particular
of the “shirking” and “gift-exchange” models) that above market
clearing wages generate gains in terms of employees’ productivity
(in this particular case savings in supervision costs).
However, the latter evidence is necessary but not suﬃcient to
support eﬃciency wages as one needs also to show that the above
market clearing wages were actually eﬃcient, i.e. to show that wages
‘paid for themselves’ (Levine 4992).
A simple test of the latter hypothesis can be provided by compar-
ing the associated beneﬁts and costs of the higher wage, based on es-
timates from the 98/99 care homes sample. The marginal cost of the
higher wage can be calculated as a 4% increase in the average wage
of non-managerial, aﬀected workers, which for the pre-introduction
survey is $3.87 per hour. Thus an estimate of the marginal cost of
a 4% increase in the wage of non-managerial employees above the
initial (market clearing) wage is $0.0387 per hour, per employee.
The marginal beneﬁt of the wage is the fall in supervision costs
as we estimated that wage increases are associated with reduction in
the number of managerial employees per non-managerial employee.
In particular a 4% increase in the average wage at home is associ-
ated with a 5.2% fall in the number of managerial employees per
worker.56 Therefore, provided that the average number of manage-
rial employees per non-managerial employee is 0.13.1 in the before
4999 introduction sample and that the average wage of managerial
employees is $5.5, the fall in supervision costs generated by the 4%
56T h e2 S L Se s t i m a t ef r o ms p e c i ﬁcation (2) of the upper panel of table 15 is not an estimate
of the elasticity of supervision intensity w.r.t the wage. In particular our estimate provides
that
d(N/L)
d ln w = −0.57, where N/L is the ratio of supervisors to workers and w is the wage.
Therefore to derive the associated elasticity we need to divide the estimate with the sample
average of the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees, which is 0.11.
34increase in the wage will be equal to $0.031357 per employee, per
hour, which is lower than the increase in the wage costs.
A wage-supervision trade-oﬀ estimate for which the increase in
wage costs generated by the minimum wage is exactly oﬀset by a
fall in supervision costs should be around 0.7. However, in the
case that the increase in the wage generates substitution of manage-
rial for non-managerial employees, the 2SLS estimate of the wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ is a moderate58 estimate of the true wage-
supervision trade-oﬀ, which further implies that it may be possible
that the NMW introduction may be such that the increase in wage
costs per employee is exactly or more than oﬀset the increase in
supervision costs.
All in all the evidence in this section provide support to the tenet
of eﬃciency wages that above market-clearing wages generate gains
in terms of employees productivity and thus because of this reason a
binding minimum wage may not hurt proﬁts very much, fact which
could further explain why although the minimum wage generated
signiﬁcant increases in wage costs across care homes, employment
eﬀects were quite moderate. This latter ﬁnding provides support to
the main hypothesis of interest which suggests that because of im-
portant eﬃciency wages considerations in low-wage labour markets,
the imposition of a binding minimum wage is not expected to gen-
erate signiﬁc a n ti n c r e a s e si nc o s t sa n dt h u su n d e s i r e de m p l o y m e n t
adjustments for workers or policy makers.
5.6 Employees Quality and Turnover
Diﬀerent theoretical models of eﬃciency wages focus on diﬀerent
gains in terms of employees’ productivity generated by higher wages.
In the shirking. model (Stiglitz 4984) higher wages increase eﬀort or
reduce shirking by employees, whereas in the turnover model (Salop
4979) and the adverse selection model (Weiss 4980, 4990) higher
wages reduce turnover and improve the average ‘quality’ of ﬁrm’s
applicants respectively.
In the previous sections we found some evidence that higher
wages generated by the NMW 4999 introduction reduce supervi-
sion intensity and therefore supervision costs but no evidence that
the NMW 4999 introduction and 2004 increase, raised eﬀo r to rt h e
intensity of work for employees in care homes. In this section we
are looking for any evidence on any other employees’ productivity
related gains that may have been the result of the above market
clearing pay generated by the NMW introduction and increase.
57Calculated as follows: 0.052*0.11*$5.5.
58Rebitzer (1995) also notes that in general IV estimates are moderate estimates of the true
relationship of interest.
35Tables 14 and 15 summarise estimation results of the impact of
the NMW on the ‘quality’ and the turnover rate of the employees
across care homes. According to the adverse selection model of
eﬃciency wages, higher wages will improve the average quality of
ﬁrm’s applicants. Moreover, based on the turnover model, as higher
wages will decrease quits and increase the recruitment rate of the
ﬁrm average tenure in the ﬁrm will rise and in turn this will lead in
an increase in the average stock of human capital of ﬁrm’s employees.
In the upper panel of table 14 are summarised the results of the
NMW impact on the change in average age of employees at home,
where average age is viewed as a proxy of the employees’ experience
on the job and thus the average human capital in the care home.
We ﬁnd no evidence of an NMW eﬀect on the change in the average
age of employees across care homes.
Similarly the lower panel of table 14 presents estimates of the
eﬀect of the NMW on the average tenure of employees in care homes.
Again, no evidence is produced of any signiﬁcant eﬀect of the NMW
on the average tenure of employees in care homes for both the 98/99
and 01/02 samples.
Finally, table 15 summarises estimation results of the eﬀects on
the NMW on change in care homes quit and recruitment rate re-
spectively. Once more, the results are uniformly insigniﬁcant across
all speciﬁcations and minimum wage measures used.
Therefore, the main conclusion of this section is that we ﬁnd no
evidence of any other gains, as reductions in quits or increase in
recruitment and in average tenure or average age of employees in
care homes, resulted from the NMW introduction and increase.
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper is to test empirically the validity
of eﬃciency wages theory exploiting a quasi-natural experiment from
a low-wage labour market, the UK residential care homes industry,
provided by the 1999 introduction and 2001 increase in the UK
National Minimum Wage. The imposition of a binding minimum
wage in general oﬀers an ideal research design to test the validity
of eﬃciency wages as the essence of eﬃciency wages is that above
market clearing wages are generating gains in terms of employees’
productivity. This ideal research design oﬀers the opportunity to
test one of the main predictions of the ‘shirking’, that in equilibrium
an increase in the wage will cause a fall in supervision intensity,
ceteris paribus.
Our main contribution is that we address the main empirical
problems, namely endogeneity, measurement error and observational
equivalence, that hinder the estimation of the wage-supervision re-
36lationship. Probably the most important problem, that makes the
empirical testing of eﬃciency wages particularly vexing and seems to
be neglected in the literature, is that overcoming the main empirical
problems and producing evidence that supports a wage-supervision
trade-oﬀ is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for the validity
of eﬃciency wage theory.
Although, the central tenet of eﬃciency wages that suggests that
above market-clearing wages aﬀect workers’ productive behaviour,
the second fundamental feature of eﬃciency wages is that, the above-
market clearing setting of wages is done in an eﬃcient, proﬁt-maximising
w a y .T h e r e f o r ew ea l s oe x p l o i tt h en a t u r eo ft h em i n i m u mw a g ei n -
troduction into a previously unregulated labour market and the ev-
idence of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ produced for the 1999 NMW
increase to test the latter condition of eﬃciency wages.
We ﬁnd that wage increases generated by the 1999 NMW intro-
duction reduced the intensity of supervision in the care homes in-
dustry, and thus this ﬁnding provides support to the eﬃciency wages
theoretical rationale that wages and supervision are substitutes in
regulating employees eﬀort. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as in-
direct evidence of wage eﬀects on workers’ productive behaviour.
Moreover, we also ﬁnd that the increase in wage above the mar-
ket clearing level produced by the introduction of a binding mini-
mum wage in a previous unregulated low-wage industry, was more
or less exactly oﬀset by the fall in supervision costs. This latter ﬁnd-
ing combined with the ﬁrst ﬁnding that supports the productivity
augmenting property of higher wages provide support to eﬃciency
wages and thus also to the central premise of the thesis that eﬃ-
ciency wages may be particularly valid in low-wage labour markets,
where the minimum wage is binding.
The latter result has important policy implications and suggests
that eﬃciency wages may provide valuable insight into how low-
wage labour markets operate. In order to further test the latter
conjecture we also estimate the eﬀects of the 1999 and 2001 NMW
introduction on wages, employment, prices, proﬁts, output, eﬀort
and productivity, as empirical evidence can be further used to check
the usefulness of our eﬃciency wages theoretical model in explaining
the evidence on the economics eﬀects of the minimum wage in a low-
wage labour market, the UK residential care homes industry.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the NMW increased wages in both 1999 and
2001 but the 2001 wage eﬀects are larger in contrast to the ﬁndings
of Machin and Wilson (2004) who found higher eﬀects for the 1999
introduction. Moreover, although wages increased signiﬁcantly as a
result of the NMW introduction and increase, we ﬁnd some evidence
of relative moderate employment reductions for the 1999 and no
employment eﬀects for the 2001 period.
Our analysis ﬁnds that prices haven’t changed as a result of the
37policy in 1999, fact that can be explained by local authority regu-
lations that capped prices, whereas prices have increased after the
2001 and proﬁts weren’t aﬀected in both periods. We also ﬁnd no ev-
idence of any NMW eﬀe c t so nl o n g - r u no u t c o m e ss u c ha se x i tf o rt h e
1999 and factors substitution for both periods, with the latter being
explained mainly by the fact that it is unlikely that substitution have
taken place within a period of two or three months after the policy,
when the ‘post-treatment’ surveys have been conducted. Finally,
except of the evidence in support of a wage-supervision trade-oﬀ
produced for the 1999 NMW introduction we also ﬁnd some evi-
dence that output fell in 1999 and that eﬀort based on subjective
employers’ responses has remain unchanged in 1999 and 2001.
All in all our ﬁndings in this paper seem to provide support to
eﬃciency wage theory and thus may further suggest that eﬃciency
wages could shed much light into the working of low-wage labour
markets.
387T a b l e s
Table 1:  July 1998/May 1999 Survey Descriptive Statistics 
 






Number of Homes  548  579  195  195 




































































Proportion of Workers with 
missing information  0.11 0.098  0.045  0.086 
Proportion Female  0.89  0.9  0.91  0.90 








Proportion Care Assistants  0.63  0.62  0.63  0.64 
Proportion With Nursing 
Qualification  0.1 0.11  0.12  0.12 
















Occupancy Rate  0.85  0.88  0.86  0.87 
Average Weekly Price  









Proportion DSS/Local Authority  0.49  0.53  0.47  0.5 
Supervision Intensity 
  0.11 0.13  0.11  0.126 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Pre-minimum and post-minimum statistics are calculated using 
observations from the pre-NMW introduction and post-NMW introduction sample. All averages are 
calculated across homes.  Supervision intensity is calculated as the ratio of managerial to non-
managerial employees at home. The occupation of care assistants includes senior, day and junior carers 
but exclude night carers and sleep-ins.    
39Table 2: August 2001/February 2002 Survey Descriptive Statistics 
 
  All Firms  Balanced Panel  Balanced Panel 
(Excluding firms with a lot 














Number of Homes  411  333  152  152  130  130 

































































































Proportion of  
Workers with missing 
information 




Proportion Female  0.86  0.88  0.9  0.88  0.90  0.87 





















Proportion With Nursing 
Qualification  0.023  0.02 0.023 0.022 0.025 0.022 












Average Weekly Price 


















0.48 0.45  0.497  0.467 
 




0.09 0.074  0.089  0.077 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Pre-minimum and post-minimum statistics are calculated using 
observations from the pre-NMW introduction and post-NMW introduction sample. All averages are 
calculated across homes. The last two columns include homes in the balanced sample with less than 
half workers information missing. Supervision intensity is calculated as the ratio of managerial to non-
managerial employees at home. The occupation of care assistants includes senior, day and junior carers 
but exclude night carers and sleep-ins.    
 
 
40Table 3: The “Bite” of the 1999 National Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
98/99 









% Paid Less Than Their Age- 
Specific Minimum Wage  23 0.66  21  0.75 
% Paid Less Than  
The Adult Minimum Wage (only 
covered workers are considered) 
29 1.8  28.8  2.2 
% Paid Less Than  
The Adult Minimum Wage (all 
workers) 
30 3.3  30.5  4 
Wage Gap  0.024  0.0012  0.019  0.0007 
% Paid Exactly Their Age 
Specific Minimum Wage  7.9 19.8  8.6  20 
% Paid Exactly The Adult 
Minimum Wage (only covered 
workers) 
8.1 22.6  8.7  22.6 
% Paid Exactly the Adult 
Minimum Wage (all workers)  8.8 24  9.2  23.8 
Number of Homes  548  579  195  195 
 
Notes: The age specific National Minimum Wage is £3.6 per hour for those above 21 years old (the 
adult rate) and £3 per hour for those between 18 and 21 inclusive and also  including those that are 
above 21 who are undertaking formal training and who are in the first six months of employment (the 
development rate). The wage gap variable indicates the proportional increase in the weekly wage bill if 
the wages of those affected were increased to their age specific minimum rate.  
Table 4: The “Bite” of the National Minimum Wage 2001 increase 
 
  All Firms  Balanced Panel  Balanced Panel 
(Excluding firms with a lot 














% Paid Less Than Their 
Age- Specific Minimum 
Wage 
22.3 1.7 19 1.4  20.1  1.4 
% Paid Less Than  
The Adult Minimum 
Wage (only covered 
workers are considered) 
25.2 2.7  21.5  2.1 23 2.2 
% Paid Less Than  
The Adult Minimum 
Wage (only covered  
workers) 
29.1 4.6  25.7  4.06  26.7  4.06 
Wage  Gap  0.0153  0.0052 0.0135 0.0038 0.0134 0.0042 
% Paid Exactly Their Age 
Specific Minimum Wage  4.1 18.2  4.1  16.1  4.5  15.7 
% Paid Exactly The Adult 
Minimum Wage (only 
covered workers) 
4.2 18.1  4.4  16.8  4.9  16.7 
% Paid Exactly the Adult 
Minimum Wage (all 
workers) 
4.7 19.5  4.6  17.7  5.09  17.4 
Number of Homes  411  333  152  152  130  130 
 
Notes: The age specific National Minimum Wage is £4.1 per hour for those above 21 years old (the 
adult rate) and £3.5 per hour for those between 18 and 21 including those that are above 21 who are 
undertaking formal training and who are in the first six months of employment (the development rate). 
The wage gap variable indicates the proportional increase in the weekly wage bill if the wages of those 
affected were increased to their age specific minimum rate.  
 
  
41Table 5: The Effects of the UK National Minimum on Home Level Average 
Hourly and Average Weekly Wages 
 
Change in log Hourly Wage 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.12 
(0.024) 
0.13 
(0.027)     0.26 
(0.048) 
0.26 
(0.05)    
Wage gap 
   1.16 
(0.18) 
1.16 





No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.12  0.18 0.18  0.24 0.18  0.31 0.21  0.36 
Number of 
Homes  182 182  182  182  134 134  134  134 
 
Change in log Weekly Wage 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
% Low-paid  0.08 
(0.069) 
0.098 
(0.076)     0.17 
(0.1) 
0.14 
(0.1)    
Wage gap     0.49 
(0.53) 
0.42 





No  Yes  No Yes No Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.008 0.1  0.0048 0.097  0.02  0.22  0.026  0.23 
Number of 
Homes  182  182 182  182  134  134 134  134 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 




42Table 6: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on Home Level 
Number of Employees and on Total Weekly Hours 
 
Change in log Number of Employees 
 98/99  01/02 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
% Low-paid  -0.28 
(0.1) 
-0.33 
(0.11)     0.17 
(0.22) 
0.15 
(0.23)    
Wage gap 
   -1.01 
(0.8) 
-1.05 





No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.038 0.089  0.0085 0.077  0.004 0.093  0.0003  0.088 
Number of 
Homes  194  194 188 188 148  148  141 141 
 
Change in log Total Weekly Hours 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  -0.23 
(0.15) 
-0.19 
(0.17)     0.18 
(0.25) 
0.17 
(0.27)    
Wage gap 
   -1.74 
(1.23) 
-1.44 





No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.012 0.063 0.01  0.063  0.004 0.07 0.0016  0.07 
Number of 
Homes  185  185 185 185 135  135  135 135 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 




43Table 7: The Effects of the National Minimum Wage on Average Weekly Price of 
Bed  
 
Change in the log average weekly price of  bed 
 01/02 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
%Low-paid  0.22 
(0.077) 
0.2 
(0.08)    
Wage gap 





No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 
0.056  0.13 0.04 0.14 
Number of 
Homes  142 142 135 135 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 





Table 8: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on Weekly trading 
surplus rate of Care Homes 
 
Change in Weekly Trading Surplus Rate 
 98/99  01/02 




(0.24)     -0.37 
(0.76) 
-0.39 
(0.55)    
Wage gap     0.012 
(1.71) 
0.84 




Controls  No  Yes  No Yes No Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.0001 0.093 0.0001  0.096  0.0021  0.55  0.004 0.55 
Number of 
Homes  150  150  144 144 117 117  112  112 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 
samples (missing values were imputed with sample means). Weekly trading surplus rate is calculated 
as weekly revenue (average weekly price of bed times number of residents minus total costs (total 
labour costs calculated as the total weekly wage bill divided by the proportion of labour costs in total 
costs) and all this divided by weekly revenue. Because of lack of information on the number of 
residents in 01/02 sample, trading surplus was calculated as described above but using the number of 
beds instead of the number of residents.  
 
44Table 9: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on Measures of 
Capital/Labour Ratio 
 
Change in log Number of Beds per Employee 
 98/99  01/02 
 






(0.1)     -0.16 
(0.18) 
-0.2 
(0.18)    
Wage gap 
   0.57 
(0.69) 
0.55 





No Yes  No Yes No Yes No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.018 0.065 0.0037  0.076  0.0056 0.14  0.0019  0.14 
Number of 
Homes  192 192 186 186 148 148  141  141 
 
Change in log Number of Beds per Weekly Hour  
 98/99  01/02 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.21 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(0.12)     -0.19 
(0.2) 
-0.22 
(0.21)    
Wage gap     1.2 
(0.87) 
1.06 




Controls No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.019  0.096 0.01 0.09  0.0063  0.13  0.002  0.13 
No of 
Homes  183 183 183  183  135  135  135  135 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 





45Table 10: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on High to Low 
Skilled Employees Ratio 
 
Change in ratio of Employees with Nursing Qualification to those with no Qualification 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
%Low-paid  0.026 
(0.24) 
-0.006 
(0.22)     0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.018)    
Wage gap 
   -0.42 
(1.9) 
-0.52 





No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.0001 0.35  0.0003  0.35  0.002 0.51  0.002  0.54 
Number of 
homes  182  182  178 178 148  148 141 141 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 




46Table 11: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on High to Low 
Skilled Employees Ratio 
 
Change in ratio of Employees with Nursing Qualification to those with no Qualification 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
%Low-paid  0.026 
(0.24) 
-0.006 
(0.22)     0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.018)    
Wage gap 
   -0.42 
(1.9) 
-0.52 





No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.0001 0.35  0.0003  0.35  0.002 0.51  0.002  0.54 
Number of 
homes  182  182  178 178 148  148 141 141 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 




47Table 12: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage  on Labour 
productivity and Subjective Effort 
 
Change in the log number of residents per employee 
 01/02 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
%Low-paid  -0.15 
(0.28) 
0.059 
(0.28)    
Wage gap 





No Yes No  Yes 
R-squared  0.0022 0.18 0.0012  0.17 
Number of 
Homes  131 131 124  124 
 
Change in the log number of residents per weekly hour 




(0.28)    




Controls No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.006  0.14  0.004  0.14 
Number of 
Homes  119 119 119  119 
 
Change in subjective effort 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Low-Paid  -0.13 
(0.41) 
-0.41 
(0.48)    




Controls No  Yes  No  Yes 
Prob>Chi-
squared (LR)  0.75 0.45 0.32  0.39 
No of Homes  131  131  125  125 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In the upper and middle panel we use the standard controls we 
use throughout all regressions, whereas in the lower panel we include also separation and recruitment 
rate and average tenure as well as missing value dummies for these variables. Iinformation on dss/la 
residents is used in the calculation of productivity ratios because of lack of information on the actual 
number of residents.  The lower panel presents ordered probit estimates, where the effort variable is 
coded as an ordered response with values 0 if effort is reported to fall, 1 if effort doesn’t change and 2 
if effort reported to increase.  
48Table 13: OLS versus 2SLS Estimates of the Wage Elasticity of Supervision 
Intensity 
 
Change in the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees 
98/99 01/02 
(1) (2) (1) (2)   
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 


















Controls No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.012  0.0001 0.37  0.37  0.07  0.0001  0.11  0.07 
Number of 
Homes  178 190 142 147 133 145 131 138 
 
Change in the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees 
98/99 01/02 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 


















Controls  No No Yes  Yes No No Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.012 0.0001 0.37  0.36  0.07  0.0022  0.11  0.07 
Number of 
Homes  178 184 142 147 133 139 131 139 
 
Notes: The upper and lower panels present 2SLS estimates when the proportion low-paid and the wage 
gap are used respectively as instruments for the change in log average wage at home. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Controls for 98/99 include the standard controls used throughout as well as month 
response and ownership dummies, whether home is part of larger organisation dummy, quit rate, 
recruitment rate, residents per weekly hour, beds per weekly hour and all other costs to labour costs 
ratio as well as missing values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and average age for which 
missing values were imputed with sample means. Controls for 01/02 include the standard controls used 
throughout as well as ownership dummies, whether home is part of larger organisation dummy, quit 
rate, recruitment rate, beds per weekly hour as well as missing values dummies for proportion of la/dss 




49Table 14: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on Average Age and 
Average Tenure of Employees 
 
Change in log Average Age 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.035 
(0.039) 
0.019 
(0.042)     0.04 
(0.052) 
0.016 
(0.05)    
Wage gap 
   0.043 
(0.3) 
0.002 





No  Yes  No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes 
R-squared 
0.0045 0.083  0.0001 0.083 0.012  0.14 0.0001  0.1 
Number of 
Homes  183  183 180  180 138  138 133  133 
 
Change in log Average Tenure  
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.17 
(0.1) 
0.16 
(0.11)     0.035 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.19)    
Wage gap 
   1.24 
(0.79) 
1.14 





No Yes No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.015 0.079 0.013  0.074  0.0003 0.11  0.0034  0.12 
Number of 
Homes  187  187  184 184  143  143  138 138 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age (included only 
in the average tenure regressions), proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents  
and county dummies, as well as missing values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for 






Table 15: The Effects of the UK National Minimum Wage on Quit and 
Recruitment Rate 
 
Change in Quit Rate 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.081 
(0.05) 
0.043 
(0.055)     -0.012 
(0.058) 
-0.024 
(0.061)    
Wage gap 
   0.27 
(0.4) 
0.065 





No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.013 0.13  0.0026 0.19  0.0003 0.1  0.0009  0.12 
Number of 
Homes  184  184  178 178  148  148  141 141 
 
Change in Recruitment Rate 
 98/99  01/02 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
% Low-paid  0.03 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.055)     0.034 
(0.06) 
0.035 
(0.07)    
Wage gap 
   0.39 
(0.63) 
0.2 





No  Yes  No  Yes No Yes No  Yes 
R-squared 
0.0061 0.14 0.0022  0.23  0.0018 0.082  0.0016  0.092 
Number of 
Homes  187  187  181  181 148 148 141  141 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion 
with nursing qualification, proportion of la/dss residents and county dummies, as well as missing 
values dummies for proportion of la/dss residents and for average age for both the 98/99 and the 01/02 
samples (missing values were imputed with sample means). The quit and recruitment rates are 
calculated using information on the number of employees left and the number of employees recruited 
in the last three months from the time of each survey.  



































Figure 1: The scatter plot of the number of managers of the whole before 1999 NMW introduction care 
































Figure 2: The scatter plot of the number of managers of the whole before 2001 NMW increase care 
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Figure 5: The cross-section distribution of the number of non managerial employees  in the before 1999 


























0 20 40 60 80
number of non managerial workers
 
 
Figure 6: The cross-section distribution of the number of non managerial employees  in the after 1999 





















Figure 7: The cross-section distribution of the number of managers in the before 2001 NMW increase 


























Figure 8: The cross-section distribution of the number of managers in the after 2001 NMW increase 
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Figure 9: The cross-section distribution of the number of non managerial employees in the before 2001 
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Figure 10: The cross-section distribution of the number of non managerial employees in the after 2001 
























Figure.11: The distribution of hourly wages across workers covered by the development rate in the 




















Figure 12: The distribution of hourly wages across workers covered by the development rate in the 























































































Figure 16: The distribution of hourly wages across all workers in post-2001 NMW increase survey. 
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